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EITC as Income (In)Stability?
Kerry A. Ryan*
Florida Tax Review (forthcoming)

Abstract
Congress enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to entice poor single
mothers to work (or work more) as a means of lifting themselves out of poverty. Its
design as a wage subsidy that phases out at higher earnings levels is intended to
accomplish this goal. A strong labor market is crucial to the success of work-based
benefit programs, like the EITC. The EITC can motivate female household heads to work
(or work more) but they cannot act on that motivation if no jobs or additional hours exist.
This article demonstrates that during economic downturns, the EITC wage subsidy
contributes to, rather than prevents, poverty in single mother families. Lost EITC
benefits exacerbate recession-induced earnings losses, a phenomenon this article refers
to as income destabilization. In contrast, the EITC stabilizes the incomes of its wealthier
beneficiaries as increased credit amounts offset underlying salary declines. While this
pattern of income (de)stabilization is an unintended by-product of the design of the EITC
as a targeted wage subsidy, its negative impact on the economic welfare of femaleheaded households is problematic, given that these same families are the historicallytargeted program beneficiaries. This article offers a narrowly-tailored proposal that
alters the structure of the EITC during recessionary periods in order to prevent EITCinduced income destabilization.
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Introduction
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the Federal government’s largest cash-assistance
program for low-income families. In 2011, the Federal government distributed $56 billion in
cash benefits under the EITC program, almost 3.3 times more than the $17 billion of traditional
means-tested welfare dollars distributed under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program. 1

The EITC is a combination earnings subsidy and traditional means-tested

welfare program administered through the income tax system. 2
Congress enacted the EITC to entice single mothers to leave welfare and enter the labor
market. 3 The design of the EITC as a wage subsidy that phases out at higher earnings levels is
intended to accomplish this goal. Eligibility for the credit begins at the first dollar of earned
income. The credit amount then rises with earnings (phasein region), to a maximum credit
amount. After remaining at its maximum level for a range of earnings (plateau region), the credit
amount gradually declines to zero (phaseout region).

The resulting unique EITC budget

constraint creates a complicated set of work incentives and disincentives. The credit amount
clearly encourages nonworking single mothers to become employed, but the phaseout is
expected to reduce labor supply among those already working.

* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. For helpful comments and questions, I
would like to thank Leandra Lederman, Ajay Mehotra and the participants in the Indiana University Maurer School
of Law Tax Policy Colloquium; Charlene Luke, Omri Marian and the participants in the University of Florida Tax
Policy Colloquium; Katie Pratt, Ted Seto and the participants in the Loyola Los Angeles Tax Policy Colloquium;
and the participants in the Law & Society and Critical Tax Conferences. A special thanks to Jonathan Forman and
Eric Miller for especially useful feedback.
1
GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41823, LOW-INCOME ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: TRENDS IN FEDERAL
SPENDING (2012).
2
See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and The Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108
HARV. L. REV. 533, 540 (1995) [hereinafter Alstott (1995)]; Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration
of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1868-69 (2005); Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid
from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103 (2006).
3
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
3
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Many past studies of the EITC focused on its effectiveness at increasing work or work effort 4
and reducing poverty in female-headed households. 5 Generally, these program analyses focused
on the 1990s, a unique decade for analysis of the EITC for two related reasons. First, it was a
period of prolonged economic growth buoyed by a robust labor market. 6 Second, during this era,
Congress substantially expanded work-based subsidies, such as the EITC, and contracted
entitlement-based subsidies, such as welfare. Safety net reform promised female household
heads that “work would pay.” And it did. During the 1990s, many single mothers moved off
welfare and into paid employment where the combination of earnings and EITC improved their
economic well-being.
Lurking behind these EITC successes was an unforeseen danger. By linking the economic
welfare of female-headed households to work and work supports, like the EITC, such welfare
was now inextricably tied to the vagaries of the labor market. This danger was obscured by the
strong economy of the 1990s. In contrast, two economic downturns plagued the first decade of
the 2000s resulting in unprecedented levels of un- and under-employment and an overall decline

4

See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Hilary W. Hoynes, Behavioral Responses to Taxes: Lessons from the EITC and Labor
Supply, 20 TAX POL’Y AND THE ECON. 73 (2006) [hereinafter Eissa & Hoynes (2006)]; Emmanuel Saez, Optimal
Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses, 117(3) Q. J. ECON. 1039 (2002);
Bruce D. Meyer & Dan T. Rosenbaum, Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single
Mothers, 116(3) Q. J. ECON. 1063 (2001).
5
See, e.g., Bruce D. Meyer, The Effects of the EITC and Recent Reforms, 24 TAX POL’Y & ECONOMY 153, 159
(2010) (providing that “in 2007, the EITC lifted just over 1.1 million families and over 2.1 million children above
the poverty line”). But see Phyllis Jeroslow, The Earned Income Credit as an Anti-Poverty Program: Palliative or
Cure?, July 18, 2012, available at http://www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln2012/Jeroslow%20P8.pdf (arguing that
these snapshot antipoverty statistics overstate the antipoverty effectiveness of the EITC program because the official
poverty line is an inadequate measure and reflects short-term gains but does not support the upward mobility of
EITC beneficiaries).
6
See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, Remarks at the Eastern Economic Association
(Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2004/20040220/default.htm (referring
to the 1990s as the Great Moderation).
4
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in the real value of wages. 7 While all families suffered, these economic downturns hit families
headed by single mothers especially hard. 8
This leads to the question of what role, if any, does a program like the EITC, designed to
positively affect the labor supply of single mothers in order to improve their economic outcomes,
have in a world where demand side restrictions dominate? This article’s thesis is that the EITC
work incentives are rendered ineffective by a recession and, as a result, the EITC wage subsidy
fails to prevent, and lost EITC benefits may actually contribute to increasing, female-headed
household poverty. Accordingly, during economic downturns, the pro-work aspects of the EITC
should be eased, and the program should instead focus on stabilizing falling incomes to prevent
privation.
Historically, the EITC delineated between the working poor and the employable but nonworking poor. The former were viewed as “deserving” of assistance (Workers), while the latter
were viewed as undeserving because they “chose” not to work (Lazies). One crucial ingredient
to the success of the new work-based safety net was a robust labor market. Single mothers can
be incentivized to work or work more by the EITC, but they cannot claim the increased financial
reward if no jobs exists.
The historically bad labor market during the first decade of the 21st century left many single
mothers involuntarily unemployed. These female household heads do not fit into the historical
dichotomy between Workers and Lazies. They are not Workers because they are unemployed
and not Lazies because they wanted to work, but the market was such that no jobs exist. Given
that the EITC is designed to target motivation, not opportunity, 9 the EITC currently

7

See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf
8
Id.
9
See infra Part II.C. Evolution of the EITC
5
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discriminates against these single mothers based upon the state of the economy, rather than on
some workfare notion of ‘desert.’
The measure of the EITC’s antipoverty effectiveness shifted during the recent economic
downturns. If the image from the 1990s was one of the EITC reaching down into the lowest
income quintile and lifting female-headed families out of poverty, then the image from the 2000s
is one of the EITC spreading its wings preventing families in upper income quintiles from falling
into poverty as a result of wage losses. Both types of policies are “antipoverty” but they are
aimed at different beneficiaries and operate through different mechanisms.
The EITC is unique in that it can potentially perform both antipoverty functions within a
single program. The wage subsidy in the phasein range increases the incomes of low-income
female-headed households, while the phaseout range stabilizes the incomes of relatively
wealthier taxpayers experiencing temporary earnings losses. The EITC stabilizes income if the
benefit amount increases as wages decline. In that case, the increased EITC amount offsets a
portion of the earnings loss thereby stabilizing post-tax income relative to pre-tax income. 10
However, as this paper argues, the ability of the EITC to positively affect the incomes of all
of its beneficiaries depends crucially on a strong economy. During economic downturns, the
EITC continues to offer income protection to the (increased number) of claimants temporarily
falling into its eligibility range as a result of earnings losses but actually destabilizes the incomes
of poor single mothers suffering recession-induced wage declines. Income destabilization results
10

Note that from an ex ante perspective, this same mechanism provides a form of income insurance. Under an
income-based tax, the government shares in both earnings gains and losses. In the face of uncertain future income,
this effectively narrows at both ends the range of possible earnings outcomes. Income risk is thereby reduced
because the variance of post-tax income distribution is reduced. Although the income stabilization and income
insurance effects of the EITC are related, they are usefully analyzed separately. The income insurance effect is
forward looking - it operates to reduce income risk before labor is supplied. In contrast, the EITC’s stabilization
effect is backward-looking, offsetting realized earnings losses. Furthermore, stabilization applies to all earnings
shocks; whereas, insurance operates only on unexpected earnings drops. Finally, only actual recipients of the EITC
enjoy stabilization effects; whereas, all taxpayers facing uncertain future income realize risk reduction from the
existence of the EITC. I plan to explore the income insurance effect of the EITC in a later article.
6
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when the EITC amount and earnings move in the same direction. In that event, lost EITC
benefits exacerbate the underlying pay cut resulting in a larger loss to post-tax income than to
pre-tax income.
This pattern of EITC income (de)stabilization is a by-product of the design of the EITC as a
targeted wage subsidy. Just as the EITC’s uniquely-shaped budget function impacts intra-annual
labor supply incentives, so too does it affect the amount, availability, and most surprisingly the
sign (positive or negative) of the EITC’s inter-annual income stabilization capabilities. The
EITC phaseout reduces the payoff from working more within a year, but it also eases income
losses for those confronted with an annual earnings declines. While the EITC phaseout is
heralded by advocates as a targeting and cost savings device, 11 and maligned by critics as an
implicit tax creating negative labor supply incentives along the intensive margin, 12 its ability to
stabilize post-tax income in the face of salary declines is one of its most underappreciated
benefits. 13 In contrast, the wage subsidy provided in the phasein region increases the payoff
from working more within a given year, but it also exacerbates annual wage losses. While the
EITC phasein range is generally celebrated as encouraging single mothers to work, 14 these

11

See generally, INCOME TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST (Irwin Garfinkel ed.,

1982).
12

See, e.g., Paul Trampe, The EITC Disincentive: The Effects on Hours Worked from the Phase-out of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 4(3) ECON. J. WATCH 308 (2007); Edgar K. Browning, Effects of the Earned Income Tax
Credit on Income and Welfare, 48(1) NAT’L TAX J. 23 (1995); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned
Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997).
13
But see, Yair J. Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating
Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 76-78 (2012) (arguing that generally tax expenditures are destabilizing
on a macroeconomic scale, but that the phaseout of certain tax expenditures can be stabilizing, and using the EITC
as an example of a tax expenditure (destabilizing) with a phaseout (stabilizing)). Cf. Thomas J. Kniesner & James P.
Ziliak, Explicit Versus Implicit Income Insurance, 25(1) J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2002) [hereinafter Kniesner &
Ziliak, Implicit Insurance] (lamenting that the optimal tax literature misses the implicit insurance provided by tax
system, including EITC phaseout stabilization).
14
See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
7
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assessments almost universally fail to account for the range’s marginal income destabilization
effects. 15
Evidence of poor-single-mother EITC-induced income destabilization contradicts, in part,
recent claims that the EITC served in a safety net capacity during the recent economic
downturns. 16 As indicated above, the success of the EITC as a safety net program depends
crucially on whose income needs protection. Phasein range income destabilization
disproportionately impacts female-headed households. 17 The EITC is a fair-weathered friend to
these single mother families: boosting incomes when economic times are good and destabilizing
incomes when economic times are bad. Notice this is the exact opposite response pattern one
would want in a safety net program. By definition, a safety net program should increase
protection during recessionary periods. 18
This article introduces income (de)stabilization as a new variable, in addition to efficiency
and equity, to be accounted for in evaluations of the EITC program, and argues for its primacy
over competing objectives during recessionary periods. 19 Consider this quote from Alan
Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, testifying in favor of temporarily extending unemployment benefits (another income
stabilization program) after the 2001 recession:

15

But see, Listokin, supra note 13.
See, e.g., ALAN BERUBE, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW SAFETY NET: HOW THE TAX CODE HELPED LOWINCOME WORKING FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY 2000S (2006); JIMMY CHARITE ET AL., CBPP, STUDIES SHOW
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT ENCOURAGES WORK AND SUCCESS IN SCHOOL AND REDUCES POVERTY 2,7 (June 26,
2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
17
See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
18
Marianne Bitler et al., Do In-Work Tax Credits Serve as a Safety Net? 2 April 2013) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~mbitler/papers/Bitler-Hoynes-Kuka-4-23-13-final.pdf
(demonstrating that the earned income distribution for single mothers is “shifted to the left of the distribution for
married parents” and is most concentrated in the EITC phasein range).
19
See Kniesner & Ziliak, Implicit Insurance, supra note 13, at 18 (lamenting that optimal tax analyses misses
stabilization and associated consumption-smoothing as an additional welfare-enhancing aspect of an income tax to
be traded-off with equity and efficiency).
16

8
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“when you get into a period where jobs are falling, then the arguments that people
make about creating incentives to work no longer are valid and, hence, I’ve
always argued that in periods like this the economic restraints on the
unemployment insurance system almost surely ought to be eased to recognize the
fact that people are unemployed because they couldn’t get a job, not because they
don’t feel like working.” 20
In other words, in a weak labor market, a focus on work incentives is misplaced as they are likely
rendered ineffective by prevailing market conditions. Instead, during recessionary periods, cashbased safety net programs should offer relief to those experiencing involuntary wage or job
losses.
The last part of this paper offers a concrete proposal designed to accomplish this goal.
Specifically, when the economy meets some pre-defined conditions indicating a recession, the
existing EITC schedule would automatically convert to one that resembled a negative income tax
(NIT) with an income disregard. 21 Under a traditional NIT program, a maximum transfer
amount is provided to nonworkers and is immediately reduced as earnings increase at a predefined benefit reduction rate. The purpose of the income disregard is to minimize the negative
work incentives inherent in a traditional NIT by delaying the maximum benefit reduction until an
initial amount of income is earned.
In contrast, under the proposal, the income disregard is designed to prevent EITC phasein
income destabilization. In all but the phasein range, the current EITC budget function already
resembles that of an NIT with an income disregard. 22 Essentially, under the proposal, the
phasein region is eliminated but all other EITC parameters (maximum credit amount and the
20

PETE STARK, RANKING MEMBER, JOINT ECON. COMM. DEMOCRATS, THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FAR OUTWEIGH THE COSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE, ECON.
POLICY BRIEF 1 (2003), available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/uicostsbenefits10april2003.pdf (quoting Hearing on the
Economic Outlook, Before the Joint Economic Committee, 108th Cong. 17 (2003) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
21
See infra Part III.
22
Browning, supra note 12, at 24-5.

9
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threshold/completed phaseout amounts) remain unchanged. As a result, post-tax income can
only be stabilized or unaffected by the modified EITC. Upon an economic recovery, the EITC
structure automatically reverts to its original form.
The EITC critique in the article is not that EITC income destabilization is, in and of itself, a
bad thing. Under normal economic conditions, the EITC properly trades off the benefit of
providing a wage subsidy to low-income working families with the potential cost of destabilizing
the incomes of those same families if annual earnings losses occur. Instead, this article’s claim is
that in severe economic downturns, the subsidy is likely to be ineffective and the likelihood of
widespread income destabilization substantially increases. Hence, the policy balance shifts in
favor of stabilization over incentives. However, once economic conditions return to normal, the
primacy of work incentives is restored and the concern about EITC income destabilization is
diminished.
This article contributes to a small but growing chorus of scholars critical of the EITC as a
safety net program, although it distinguishes itself from these previous efforts by basing its
critique on income destabilization.23 In doing so it engages with the macroeconomic literature
on automatic stabilization, 24 and a newly emerging legal literature focused specifically on tax

23

See Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288 (2010)
(criticizing the EITC for “focus[ing] on the situation of workers while they hold jobs, ignoring the frequent spells of
job disruption due to unemployment, disability, and family needs that are common among low-wage workers. . . .It
is, thus, a shortcoming of wage subsidies in general, and not the EITC in particular, that gaps in the social safety net
leave low-income workers vulnerable to involuntary work disruption”); Sarah Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety
Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair (Aug. 22, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2134578
(relying on interviews with EITC recipients to identify the timing and payment mechanisms of the EITC as
problematic and offering a proposed solution).
24
See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers,
14(3) J. OF ECON. PERSP. 37, 40 (2000)
10
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system stabilization. 25

This paper also introduces the legal audience to the insights of

intertemporal poverty analysis, in general, 26 and as applied to the ETIC, in particular. 27
After this introduction, the article will proceed in three parts. Part I provides background
material on the EITC, detailing the program’s structure, beneficiaries, and labor supply
incentives. This first part also frames the history of the program as an evolution from antiwelfare, to anti-poverty, to its current incarnation as an anti-recession or safety net program.
Section A. of Part II describes the mechanism through which the EITC can (or cannot, as the
case may be) offer safety net protection to its beneficiaries, namely, through its ability to offset
(or exacerbate) pre-tax earnings losses. Part II’s Section B. draws out some of the normative
implications of this pattern of EITC income (de)stabilization in the context of highlighting the
winners and losers in the “EITC as safety net” paradigm. Part III is prescriptive, offering a
concrete proposal narrowly tailored to address the indicated problem of recession-induced EITC
phasein income destabilization. The article then concludes.

Part I: EITC in General
A. Background
The earned income tax credit (“EITC”) is a refundable tax credit program that provides a
subsidy to low-income working households. 28 The EITC operates to reduce a recipient’s income
25

See Lily Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 23, 61-65 (2006) (making the efficiency case for universal refundable credits as the default form tax subsidy
but arguing secondarily that such credits stabilize macroeconomic income); Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick,
Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63
STAN. L. REV. 187 (2010) (arguing that the alternative minimum tax can act as an automatic stabilizer to offset the
cyclicality of state budgets); Listokin, supra note 13, at 76-8 (2012) (applying Kenyesian macroeconomic principles
to demonstrate that most tax expenditures are procyclical).
26
See, e.g., POVERTY DYNAMICS (Tony Addison et al. eds., 2009); Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping
Into and Out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, 21(1) J. HUM. RESOURCES 1 (1986); Hulme et al., Chronic
Poverty: Meanings and Analytical Frameworks (Chronic Poverty Research Ctr, Working Paper 2, 2001).
27
Timothy Dowd & John B. Horowitz, Income Mobility and the Earned Income Tax Credit: Short-Term Safety
Net or Long-Term Income Support, 39(5) PUB. FIN. REV. 619 (2011); Timothy Dowd, Distinguishing Between
Short-Term and Long-Term Recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 787 (Dec. 2005); John B.
Horowitz, Income Mobility and the Earned Income Tax Credit, 40(3) ECON. INQUIRY 334 (2002).
11
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tax payable on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 29 If the credit amount exceeds income tax payable, the
EITC recipient receives a cash payment from the government in the amount of such excess. 30
About 87 percent of all EITC dollars are refunded rather than reducing income tax liability. 31
The EITC is targeted at working households with positive earned income and total income
below a certain threshold that varies by year and family size. 32

Although a modest EITC is

available to childless taxpayers, 33 the bulk of the program benefits flow to taxpayers with at least
one “qualifying child.” 34 The amount of the EITC is based on the presence and number of
qualifying children in the worker’s family, as well as on adjusted gross income (AGI) and earned
income. 35 The EITC amount generally equals a “credit percentage” of earned income up to the
“earned income amount.” 36

In 2013, the credit percentage for a household with: (1) no

qualifying children was 7.65 percent; (2) one qualifying child was 34 percent; (2) two qualifying
children was 40 percent; and (3) three or more qualifying children was 45 percent. 37

28

See generally I.R.C. § 32 (2006).
Id.
30
Id.
31
ALAN BERUBE, THE BROOKINGS INST., REWARDING WORK THROUGH THE TAX CODE: THE POWER AND
POTENTIAL OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT IN 27 CITIES AND RURAL AREAS 2 (2003),
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/berubetaxcode.pdf.
32
I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(1), (b)(1) (allowing the credit and describing the credit amount as a certain percentage of
“earned income” but reducing it by a certain percentage of adjusted gross income (or, if greater, the earned
income)). See also I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (defining earned income as “wages, salaries, tips, and other employee
compensation, but only if such amounts are includible in gross income for the taxable year” and net earnings from
self-employment for the taxable year). This generally means that non-workers cannot benefit from the program.
But see Noah Zatz, Revisiting the Class-Parity Analysis of Welfare Work Requirements, 83 SOC. SERV. REV. 313,
328 (2009) (arguing that unemployed spouses of EITC recipients economically benefit from the program cutting
against the claim that it only benefits workers).
33
In 2001, only 2 percent of total EITC dollars went to childless tax filers, while 98 percent of the total EITC
expenditures were paid to tax filers with at least one qualifying child. Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 83.
34
See I.R.C. § 32(c)(3) (defining “qualified child” by cross-reference to I.R.C. § 152(c) which generally uses an
age, residence, relationship, and support test).
35
See generally I.R.C. § 32.
36
I.R.C. § 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation, net earnings
from self-employment, but excludes amounts received as pensions, annuities, unemployment compensation, or
social security. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A), Treas. Reg. § 1.32-2(c)(2).
37
I.R.C. § 32 (b)(1)(A), (b)(3)(A). The increased percentage for three or more qualifying children originally
appled only in tax years 2009 and 2010. I.R.C. § 32(b)(3). However, it was extended through 2012. See Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 103, 124
29

12
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The maximum EITC amount applies to taxpayers with earned incomes between the “earned
income amount” and the “threshold phaseout amount.” 38 The maximum EITC credit then
gradually phases down over a certain income range until it reaches zero when adjusted gross
income (“AGI”) (or, if greater, earned income) equals the “completed phaseout amount.” 39 For
taxpayers in the phaseout range (those with AGI or, if greater, earned income, in excess of the
“phaseout amount”), the maximum EITC amount is reduced by the “phaseout percentage”
multiplied by the amount of AGI (or, if greater, earned income) in excess of the threshold
phaseout amount. 40 In 2013, the phaseout percentage for a household with: (1) no qualifying
children was 7.65 percent; (2) one qualifying child was 15.98 percent; (2) two qualifying
children was 21.06 percent; and (3) three or more qualifying children was 21.06 percent. 41 For
taxpayers with AGI (or, if greater, earned income) in excess of the completed phaseout amount,
no credit is allowed.

Stat. 3296, 3299 (2010). Recently it was made permanent. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-240, § 103, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013).
38
I.R.C. § 32(a), (b).
39
Id. The term “completed phaseout amount” is not a statutory term, rather, it is the term used by the IRS in its
annual administrative pronouncement on the inflation-adjusted EITC parameters. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2013-15,
2013-5 I.R.B. 444, 446.
40
I.R.C. § 32 (a)(2).
41
See CHRISTINE SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21352, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC):
CHANGES FOR 2012 AND 2013 2 (2013).
13
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The 2013 inflation-adjusted EITC amounts are set forth in Table 1. 42

Table 1: 2013 EITC Parameters
Number of Qualifying Children
None

One

Two

Three or More

$6,370

$9,560

$13,430

$13,430

Maximum EITC Credit Amount $487

$3,250

$5,372

$6,044

Threshold Phaseout Amount
(except married filing jointly)

$7,970

$17,530

$17,530

$17,530

Completed Phaseout Amount
(except married filing jointly)

$14,340 $37,870

$43,038

$46,227

$13,310 $22,870

$22,870

$22,870

$19,680 $43,210

$48,378

$51,567

Item
Earned Income Amount

Threshold Phaseout Amount
(married filing jointly)
Completed Phaseout Amount
(married filing jointly)

This set of program rules creates an EITC structure with three distinct regions.

Initially

(“phasein” region), the EITC acts as an earnings subsidy - as earnings increase, the EITC amount
increases by the applicable credit percentage of earned income. 43

The applicable credit

percentage is essentially a negative marginal tax or subsidy rate. 44 Approximately 23 percent of
EITC claimants are located in the phasein range. 45 This EITC region tends to be populated by
female-headed households. 46

Single and head of household EITC claimants outnumber their

42

Rev. Proc. 2013-15, supra note 39, at 447.
Alstott (1995), supra note 2, at 541.
44
See Daniel Shaviro, supra note 12, 459-66 (1997).
45
Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS
IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 158 (Robert A. Moffitt, ed. 2003) (or 24 percent of EITC expenditures in 1999).
46
Id. at 84 (using 2001 SOI data found that phasein range contained 25 percent of EITC head of household and
single returns as compared to only 15 percent of married couples). See also Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 8, 30 fig.
4 (demonstrating that the earned income distribution for single mothers is “shifted to the left of the distribution for
married parents” and is most concentrated in the EITC phasein range); SAUL D. HOFFMAN & LAURENCE S.
SEIDMAN, HELPING WORKING FAMILIES: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 45 (2003) [hereinafter HOFFMAN &
43
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married EITC brethren by a 3 to 1 margin. 47

The disproportionate share of single EITC

participants reflects the higher eligibility rates – due to lower earnings – of single woman with
children. 48
Over the next range of earnings (“flat” or “plateau” region), those that fall between the
earned income amount and the threshold phaseout amount, the EITC acts as a lump-sum subsidy
- the maximum EITC credit amount is provided regardless of the level of earnings. 49 The flat
region contains 19 percent of EITC claimants. 50 In the “phaseout” range (earnings in excess of
the threshold phaseout amount but less than the completed phaseout amount), the EITC acts as a
traditional means-tested income transfer program - as earnings increase, the credit amount is
reduced by the phaseout percentage. 51 The phaseout percentage operates as an implicit positive
marginal tax rate. 52 A majority (58 percent) of EITC claimants are located in the phaseout
range. 53 Due to higher earnings, married couples tend to dominate this region. Indeed, more
than two-thirds of married EITC recipients are located in the phaseout range. 54

SEIDMAN (2003)]; Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and Income
Distribution, 12 TAX POL’Y & THE ECON. 83 (1998).
47
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIALS AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
1340-41 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 GREEN BOOK] (indicating that in 2003, single and head of household claimants
accounted for 75 percent of the returns and expenditures in the EITC program; whereas, married couples accounted
for the remaining 25 percent). But see Meyer, supra note 5, at 156 (using Current Population Survey (CPS)
calculated that only 57 percent of EITC dollars go to single parents, but noting that IRS data “provide better
information on numbers of recipients and credit amounts”).
48
Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 83. In 2008, single parents were the largest EITC demographic
group representing 58.7 percent of claimants. Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 8-9, 30 fig. 4. By way of comparison,
married couples with children represented only 19.4 percent of claimants. Id. Earnings of single parent EITCeligible families tend to be lower than those of married parents. Id. at 8, 30 fig. 4.
49
Browning, supra note 12, at 24; Horowitz, supra note 27, at 334.
50
Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 158 (or 26 percent of EITC expenditures in 1999).
51
Alstott (1995), supra note 2, at 541; Horowitz, supra note 49, at 334. The paradigmatic example of an
income transfer program is welfare.
52
See supra note 44.
53
Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 158 (receiving about 50 percent of EITC expenditures in 1999).
54
Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 84 (using 2001 SOI data). ). See also Bitler et al., supra note 18 , at
8, 30 fig. 4 (demonstrating that the earnings distribution for married couples with children is shifted to the right of
the distribution for single parents).
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The 2013 EITC schedule for a head of household tax filer with two qualifying children is
graphically depicted in Figure 1. 55

B. Work (Dis)Incentives
Notice in Figure 1 that the slope of the EITC function is steeper in the phasein range than in
the phaseout range. This is a result of the higher phasein or subsidy rate as compared to the
lower phaseout or implicit tax rate. The unique shape of the EITC budget constraint results in a
complicated set of work incentives and disincentives. The EITC can impact the labor supply
decisions of working taxpayers in deciding how many hours to work and the labor force
participation decisions of currently unemployed individuals. 56

55

See note 42 and accompanying text.
See generally HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 62; Saez, supra note 4; Eissa & Hoynes
(2006), supra note 4, at 87.
56
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The EITC labor supply incentives are ambiguous and depend on an individual’s: (1) pre-tax
and transfer income and (2) the relative weights of the income versus substitution effects. 57 If
pre-tax and transfer income is located in the phasein region, the EITC acts as an increase in net
wage causing conflicting negative income and positive substitution effects. 58 The higher wage
rate provides an incentive to work more hours because it increases the return to work relative to
leisure, but the higher income provides an incentive to work less because the worker can
consume as much as before with less work. 59 The overall net effect on labor supply cannot be
predicted. 60 The EITC acts as a lump sum transfer (increase in nonlabor income with no change
in wage rate) in the plateau region creating negative income effects only. 61 Theoretically, such
effects should reduce hours worked. In the phaseout region, the EITC reduces the net wage rate
by the phaseout percentage and increases nonlabor income by the amount of the credit. 62 This
creates negative substitution and income effects, both of which are expected to reduce labor
supply. 63
Empirical studies suggest that the EITC failed to significantly impact the labor supply of
single mothers.

For example, Eissa and Liebman find a small positive (and marginally

significant) impact of the EITC on annual hours worked on all single mothers and a zero impact
on low-educated single mothers. 64 Meyer and Rosenbaum find mixed (positive and negative)

57

See generally, Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 160-163; Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 87-102;
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 57-66; and SAUL D. HOFFMAN & LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 38-42 (1990) [hereinafter HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (1990)].
58
Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 88-9; HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 62.
59
Id.
60
Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 161; Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 88-9; HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN
(2003), supra note 46, at 62.
61
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 62-3; Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 88-9.
62
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (1990), supra note 57, at 41.
63
Id.; HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 63; Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 89.
64
Nada Eissa & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit, 111 Q. J. OF
ECON. 605 (1996).
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but insignificant impacts of the EITC on hours worked for single mothers. 65 In contrast, the
ETIC did reduce the labor supply of married women (who tend to populate the phaseout range).
Hoffman and Seidman estimated that the EITC decreased the annual hours worked of married
women in EITC recipient families by 3.6 percent. 66 Eissa and Hoynes also found that past EITC
expansions were associated with decreased average hours of work for married women. 67
The EITC unambiguously creates an incentive for those single taxpayers not currently
working to enter the labor force because it raises the net wage (positive substitution effect) but
without making the individual any richer at her current hours of work (no income effect). 68
The empirical literature confirms that the EITC did in fact significantly increase labor force
participation of single mothers. For example, Eissa and Liebman estimated that the 1986 EITC
expansion 69 increased labor force participation among all single women with children by as
much as 2.8 percentage points relative to single women without children. 70

Among single

women with children most likely to be affected by the EITC (those with less than a high school
degree), the relative participation response increased to 6.1 percentage points. 71

Eissa and

Hoynes found that the labor force participation of women with children increased from 73

65

Meyer & Rosenbaum, supra note 4, at 1063.
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (1990), supra note 57, at 41.
67
Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 84. See infra text accompanying notes 87-130 (for information on
past EITC expansions).
68
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 64 (current hours of work are zero).
69
See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
70
Eissa & Liebman, supra note 64, at 605, 607. See infra text accompanying notes 87-93 (for information
about the 1986 EITC expansion).
71
Id. at 629. See also Meyer & Rosenbaum, supra note 4, at 1063 (estimating that 60 percent of the 8.7
percentage point increase in employment of single mothers between 1984 and 1996 was due to the EITC); Jeffrey
Grogger, The Effects of Time limits, the EITC and Other Policy Changes on Welfare Use, Work, and Income Among
Female-Headed Families, 85 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 394, 404 tbl. 4 (2003) (estimating that the EITC was
responsible for 34% of the increase in employment among single mothers during the 1993-1999 period).
66
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percent in 1984 to 85 percent in 2003 and no such change was evident in single women without
children during the same period. 72
C. Evolution of the EITC
1. Anti-Welfare
As told by Ventry and others, the unique design of the EITC schedule, with its phasein and
phaseout ranges, reflects its historical roots as a pro-work alternative to the negative income tax
(“NIT”) proposals of the 1960s and 1970s; such proposals themselves offered as an alternative to
the then-existing traditional means-tested welfare programs. 73 Welfare programs provided the
largest benefit to those single-mother families with zero income and phased out the transfer
amount as earnings increased at benefit reduction rates nearing 100 percent. 74 This structure was
viewed as problematic mainly because it discouraged work and self-sufficiency. 75

Critics also

complained that the welfare programs were state-specific, failed to cover all persons in need, and
that recipients were subject to a stigmatizing and demoralizing application process run by a large
and inefficient bureaucracy. 76
Reformers proposed a NIT as an alternative to traditional welfare programs. In general, NIT
plans were defined by two features: (1) a basic allowance or guaranteed minimum provided to
eligible individuals or households and (2) an offsetting tax which every recipient of the basic
allowance paid on his or her other income (typically at a rate less than 100 percent but greater
72

Eissa & Hoynes (2006), supra note 4, at 95-6. There is some new empirical evidence suggesting that the
positive labor force participation effects of the EITC leveled off after 2000. Nada Eissa, et al., Evaluation of Four
Tax Reforms in the United States: Labor Supply and Welfare Effects for Single Mothers, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 795
(2008). This study estimated welfare gains along the labor force participation margin (as a percentage of aggregate
labor income) for the 1986, 1990, 1993 and 2001 EITC reforms. Id. at 810 tbl. 2 (estimated using simulations with
“an hours-of-work elasticity equal to 0.1 and a participation elasticity equal to 0.4”). These welfare gains peaked at
4.48 percent for the 1986 EITC reform, declined by one-half after the EITC reforms in the 1990s, and fell to .64
percent with the 2001 EITC reforms. Id. The authors speculated “that by 2000, previous [EITC] reforms seem to
have eliminated much of the inefficiency along the extensive margin.” Id.
73
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income
Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY 15, 17 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, eds., 2001) [hereinafter Ventry
(2001)]; Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 144-145; HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 11-16.
74
Ventry (2001), supra note 73, at 17.
75
Id. at 16-17.
76
James Tobin et al., Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77:1 YALE L.J. 1 (1967).
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than lowest marginal rate bracket of the positive income tax). 77 The benefit amount paid to the
recipient equaled the basic allowance less the offsetting tax. 78 The NIT was viewed as superior
to welfare by its proponents because: (1) it was a national antipoverty program – available to
anyone meeting the federally-mandated (as opposed to state-specific) objective criteria; (2) tax
system administration reduced administrative and stigma-related costs; and (3) lower marginal
benefit reduction rates minimized work disincentives. 79
Senator Long (then-chairman of the Senate Finance Committee) objected to the NIT because
it provided its largest benefits to those without any earnings thereby undermining the work effort
of low-income individuals. 80 As an alternative to the NIT, he proposed a “work bonus” program
that would, inter alia, provide a wage subsidy to low-income workers. 81 Long differentiated his
program from NIT plans by emphasizing its pro-work nature. 82 Non-workers could not receive
the work bonus. 83 As an earnings subsidy, it rewarded, rather than penalized work. 84 And
although it eventually phased out, it did so at a much lower rate than any of the NIT plans. 85
Philosophically, the work bonus program “embodied Long’s vision of a program that moved
individuals off welfare and into paid employment while keeping others off the welfare rolls. It
covered only working poor families with children and forced the ‘underserving’ poor either to
choose paid employment or resort to stigmatized and inadequate [welfare] services.” 86

77

Id. at 2.
Id.
79
Ventry (2001), supra note 73, at 17, Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 142, 144.
80
Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 142.
81
Id. at 144.
82
Ventry (2001), supra note 73, at 22.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 25.
78
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2. Pro-Progressivity
During the mid-1980s, the EITC was expanded, in part, to counteract progressivity-reducing
income tax reform enacted during this period. 87 In particular, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) broadened the tax base, reduced the number of tax brackets, and reduced the top
marginal rate. 88 TRA86 was designed explicitly to be revenue neutral, and maintain the thenexisting distribution of tax burdens. 89 The expansion of the EITC was one of several tools used
to offer tax relief to low-income families as a way of offsetting the reduction in tax burden on
high-income taxpayers and thereby maintain overall burden neutrality. 90 During the 1980s, the
EITC phasein rate increased from 10 percent to 14 percent, the maximum credit amount
increased from $550 (1985) to $953 (1990) and was indexed for inflation, and the phaseout rate
decreased from 12.22 percent to 10 percent. 91

The declining phaseout rate increased the

completed phaseout amount from $11,000 (1985) to $20,264 (1990). 92 This resulted in a large
number of new EITC claimants, as total credits rose from $2.1 billion in 1985 to $7.5 billion in
1990. 93

87

Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and
International Perspective, 21(1) J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 23 (2007). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)
reduced the top marginal tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent and cut rates in all other brackets. JOEL SLEMROD &
JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 24 (4th ed. 2008).
88
Id. at 24; Thomas J. Kniesner & James P. Ziliak, Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization, 92(3) AM. ECON.
REV. 590 (2002) [hereinafter Kniesner & Ziliak, Tax Reform] (citing Berman).
89
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 87, at 25.
90
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income
Tax Credit, 1969-1999, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983, 1004 (2000) [hereinafter Ventry (2000)]. TRA86 also increased the
standard deduction and personal exemption amounts, which along with the expanded EITC, effectively removed
most of the working poor from the income tax system. Id. at 1002.
91
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 14. The 1986 reform also “indexed the EITC for inflation,
protecting workers against erosion of the credit’s real value.” STEVE HOLT, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30, 2 (2006),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/2/childrenfamilies%20holt/20060209_holt.pdf.
92
Kniesner & Ziliak, Tax Reform, supra note 88, at 594.
93
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 14.
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Tax reforms in the 1990s partially restored some measure of progressivity in the income tax
system by increasing marginal rates. 94 The EITC was expanded, in part, in the 1990s “to ensure
that federal deficit reduction initiatives did not further burden lower-income families.” 95 The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA1990) increased the EITC phasein rate,
phaseout rate and maximum credit amount and provided for a more generous credit for families
with two or more children. 96 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993) further
increased the phasein rate, phaseout rate and maximum credit amount, and extended a small
credit to childless low-income workers. 97 Overall, between 1990 and 2000, the maximum credit
amount increased from $953 to $2,353(one child) and $3,888 (two or more children). 98 During
this same period, the phasein rate increased from 14 percent to 34 percent (one child) and 40
percent (two or more children); the phaseout rate increased from 10 percent to 15.98 percent (one
child) and 21.06 percent (two or more children). 99 The corresponding credit eligibility cut-off
income level increased from $20,264 to $27,413 (one child) and $31,152 (two or more
children). 100 The EITC expansions during the 1990s almost tripled the program’s cost and
resulted in EITC spending that outpaced both traditional welfare and food stamp spending. 101

94
Picketty & Saez, supra note 87, at 23. OBRA1990 raised the top marginal income tax rate from 28 to 31
percent and OBRA93 raised it even further to 39.6 percent. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 87, at 26. TRA 97
provided a modest tax cut to middle income families through enactment of various tax credits and tax favored
savings plans and cut higher income taxpayers liability by reducing the tax rate on capital gains. Id.
95
Holt, supra note 91, at 2.
96
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 15. The EITC phasein rate increased from 14 percent to 18.5
percent for one child and 19.5 percent (two or more children), while the phaseout rate increased from 10 percent to
13.21 (one child) and 13.93 (two or more children). Id.
97
Id.
98
TAX POLICY CTR., EARNED INCOME TAX PARAMETERS, 1976-2012 (2012),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=36 (dollar amounts not adjusted for inflation).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Holt, supra note 91, at 2 (citing Ventry). TRA1997 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 included
provisions to improve compliance. 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 47, at 13-35.
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3. Anti-Poverty
During the 1990s the expanded EITC took on a new role as a major antipoverty initiative
replacing the traditional entitlement-based social safety net with a set of work-first initiatives. 102
President Clinton publically declared that full-time work at minimum wage plus the EITC would
be enough to lift families out of poverty. 103 The expansion of the EITC in the 1990s was meant
to make good on Clinton’s pledge to “make work pay.” 104
At the same time, traditional means-tested welfare in the US was undergoing a dramatic
transformation.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

(PRWORA), 105 signed into law in 1996, replaced the existing federal welfare program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with a program called Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). 106 Since 1935, the AFDC program had provided an entitlement to
cash-aid for low-income, primarily single-parent families with children. 107 Its replacement,
TANF, invested more program authority in the states, imposed new stringent work requirements
and sanctions for noncompliance, and a lifetime benefit time limit of five years or less. 108
Federal funding also changed from an unlimited matching formula under AFDC to a limited-in-

102

Ventry (2000), supra note 90, at 1008; Hotz & Scholz, supra note 45, at 146.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996).
106
See generally Rebecca M. Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 1105
(2002), HANMING FANG & MICHAEL P. KEANE, THE BROOKINGS INST., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF WELFARE
REFORM ON SINGLE MOTHERS, 2004 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1 (2004).
107
MARIANNE BITLER & HILARY W. HOYNES, THE BROOKINGS INST., The State of the Social Safety Net in the
Post-Welfare Reform Era, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 71 (2010); SHEILA ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., THE
URBAN INST., What Role Is Welfare Playing in This Period of High Unemployment (2011),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412378-Role-of-Welfare-in-this-Period-of-HighUnemployment.pdf?RSSFeed=UI_PovertyandSafetyNet.xml.
108
Yonatan Ben-Shalom et al., An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Anti-Poverty Programs in the United
States, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY 709 (Philip N. Jefferson ed., 2012) (providing
that federal funds cannot be used to pay more than five years of benefits to a single parent over her lifetime and may
be unavailable to states that do not set a minimum work requirements); BITLER & HOYNES, supra note 107, at 16.
103
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amount block grant under TANF. 109 These changes effectively ended the entitlement nature of
welfare. 110
These changes to welfare, combined with a substantially expanded EITC, compounded by a
strong economy, led to a plummeting in welfare participation 111 and caseloads and a large
fraction of former welfare recipients entering the workforce. 112

In a sense, the EITC was the

carrot pulling single mothers off welfare and into paying jobs. 113 By the end of the 1990s, cash
welfare caseloads had fallen by more than 50 percent (from their peak in 1994) down to levels
not seen since 1970. 114 Between 1992 and 2000, the employment rate of single women with
children increased by 15.3 percentage points from 69.4 to 84.7 percent and the child poverty rate
declined 6.1 percentage points from 22.3 to 16.2 percent. 115 By the end of the 1990s, the EITC
emerged as the largest cash assistance program for working lower-income families lifting
approximately 4 million persons out of poverty. 116
Safety net reformers assumed that work and work supports, rather than welfare receipt,
would improve economic, social and material outcomes for low-income households, particularly
single-mother families.

Empirical data supports the conclusion that during the 1990s, the

economic situation of single mothers improved by leaving welfare and entering the workforce117

109

Id.
Id.
111
FANG & KEANE, supra note 106, at 1.
112
Ventry (2000), supra note 90, at 1008 (by 80 percent); HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 4;
THOMAS GABE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41917, WELFARE, WORK, AND POVERTY STATUS OF FEMALE-HEADED
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: 1987-2009 17 fig.3 (2011).
113
Ventry (2000), supra note 90, at1008. See also Grogger, supra note 71, at 405 (concluding that “the EITC
may be the single most important policy measure for explaining the decrease in welfare and the rise in work and
earnings among female-headed families in recent years”).
114
BITLER & HOYNES, supra note 107, at 71-2.
115
Id. See also Grogger, supra note 71, at 405 (finding that the EITC explained 34 percent of the increase in
employment by female family heads between 1993-1999).
116
HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 5.
117
MEYER & ROSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 1074 fig. II (illustrating the dramatic increase in post-tax return to
working for single mothers between 1984 and 1996).
110
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and that a large part of that improvement was related to the expanded EITC. 118 This was
especially true for the lowest-skilled single mothers who were on welfare and whose earnings
placed them in the phasein or flat region of the EITC. 119

Indeed, the largest change in

employment for single mothers during the period 1986-2007 was for those without a high school
diploma. 120
4. Anti-Recession: Safety Net Program?
Lurking behind these EITC successes was an unforeseen danger. By linking the economic
welfare of female-headed households to work and work supports, like the EITC, such welfare
was now inextricably tied to the cyclicality of the labor market. 121 Such danger was obscured by
the strong economy of the 1990s. However, the risks associated with a work-based social safety
net came to light during the economic downturns of the early 2000s.
In 2001, the U.S. economy experienced its first recession in over decade. The 2001 recession
was notable for its short length and mild effect. 122 A long jobless recovery characterized by slow
growth and high unemployment followed this recession. 123 The Great Recession officially began
in December 2007 and lasted 18 months. 124 It was the longest and deepest economic downturn
since the Great Depression. 125 The Great Recession resulted in an overall decline in the real
value of wages 126 and the largest increase in unemployment in the post-World War II era. 127

118

Grogger, supra note 71, at 405 (calculating that EITC expansions during the 1990s explained 15.8 percent of
the decline in welfare use over the period 1993-1999).
119
Meyer, supra note 47, at 163.
120
Id.
121
BITLER & HOYNES, supra note 107, at 97.
122
MARC LABONT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE 2007-2009 RECESSION: SIMILARITIES TO AND
DIFFERENCES FROM THE PAST “Summary”, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40198.pdf
123
Id.
124
BUSINESS CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html (last visited March 21, 2013).
125
LABONT, supra note 122.
126
See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf
127
LABONT supra note 122, at 4.
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Unemployment during the Great Recession rose from 5 percent to a post-recession high in
October 2009 of 10.1 percent, a 5.1 percentage point increase. 128 In comparison, unemployment
rose only 2 percentage points during the 2001 recession (from 4.3 percent to a post-recession
high of 6.3 percent). 129
Generally, the parameters of the EITC did not change substantially during the two economic
downturns during the first decade of the 2000s. Most of the EITC modifications during this
period addressed narrow, specific issues; including: complexity, marriage penalties, and lack of
accommodation for larger families. 130 Neither the overall structure nor level of generosity
changed in response to the unprecedented levels of un- and under-employment and overall
decline in the real value of wages accompanying the 2001 and 2008 recessions.
This question then becomes how, if at all, did the EITC respond during the recent economic
downturns?

Some commentators claimed that the EITC served as an income-based safety net

for families during the 2001 and 2008 recessions. 131 The next Part II demonstrates that while the
EITC offered income protection to its wealthier beneficiaries, it offered no safety net protection
to its poorest recipients suffering recession-induced wage and job losses.
Part II: EITC as Safety Net?
Subpart A. of this Part II describes the mechanism through which the Federal tax system, in
general, and the EITC, in particular, can (or cannot) offer income-based safety net protection to
families through its ability to stabilize (or destabilize) income in the face of pre-tax earnings

127

WAYNE VROMAN, THE URBAN INST., THE GREAT RECESSION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND POVERTY 1,
http://www.urban.org/publications/412072.html.
128
LABONT, supra note 122 , at 4 tbl. 2.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 32(b)(3) (marriage penalty relief, increased credit percentage for families with 3 or more
children).
131
See, e.g., BERUBE, supra note 16; JIMMY CHARITE ET AL., CBPP, STUDIES SHOW EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT ENCOURAGES WORK AND SUCCESS IN SCHOOL AND REDUCES POVERTY 2,7 (June 26, 2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
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losses.

Subpart B. draws out the normative implications of this pattern of income

(de)stabilization in the context of highlighting the winners and losers in the “EITC as safety net”
paradigm.
A. Income Stabilization
1. Federal Tax System, In General
a. Household Level
The Federal tax system operates automatically to stabilize income in the event of an earnings
loss. When a household experiences a salary decline, reduced tax liabilities will offset a portion
of that decline, thereby stabilizing post-tax income relative to pre-tax income. 132 Stabilization
results when the absolute size of the loss in post-tax income is less than the absolute size of the
loss in pre-tax earnings. 133
For purposes of this article, the amount of income loss offset provided by the tax system will
be measured by the ratio of the absolute change in tax liability to the absolute change in gross
income. 134 This will be referred to as the stabilization ratio. 135 In effect, it is the percentage of a
pre-tax earnings drop that does not carry through to post-tax income because of offsetting

132

RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 288 (1964). Government transfers, such as unemployment
insurance (UI), food stamps (SNAP), and welfare (TANF) and can also cushion an income loss resulting in a
reduced effect of such loss on after-transfer income. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, The Consumption Smoothing
Benefits of Unemployment Insurance, 87(1) AM. ECON. REV. 192 (1997) (empirically examining whether UI
compensation smoothes consumption between periods of employment and unemployment and finds considerable
evidence of smoothing; Jonathan Gruber, Cash Welfare as a Consumption Smoothing Mechanism for Single
Mothers
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Res.,
Working
Paper
5738,
1996),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5738.pdf (studying whether the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program smoothes the consumption of women who experienced the event of becoming a single mother); SUSAN
DYNARSKI & JONATHON GRUBER, THE BROOKINGS INST., The State of the Social Safety Net in the Post-Welfare
Reform Era, 1997:1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 229 (1997).
133
GOODE, supra note 132, at 287 n.3 (citing E. Cary Brown for the proposition that “a tax is an automatic
stabilizer if the absolute size of the change in income . . . is smaller when the tax is in existence than it would be in
the absence of the tax” but noting that other definitions exist); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 75 (5th
ed., 1987); Kniesner & Ziliak, Implicit Insurance, supra note 13, at 5.
134
PECHMAN, supra note 133, at 74; GOODE, supra note 132, at 287.
135
Note that a destabilization ratio will be introduced in Part II.A.2.ii.(A)(3) Within Phasein: Marginal
Destabilizationbelow.
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decreases in tax payments. On a macroeconomic scale, this measure has been called the tax
system’s “built-in flexibility” 136 or “normalized tax change. 137
The Federal income tax system is progressive, meaning that a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate
increases or decreases with income. 138 Under such a system, a taxpayer’s average tax rate will
be lower than the marginal rate but it too will decrease or increase with income. 139 In the event
of an annual wage loss occurring under a progressive tax system, income tax payments decline
by a greater percentage than the change in income itself. 140

As earnings fall, not only is the

amount subject to tax lower (lower tax base), but that lower taxable amount is subject to a lower
average tax rate. 141

As a result, post-tax income changes by a lower percentage than the change

in pre-tax wages.
The Federal payroll tax system is proportionate, meaning it has a single rate applied to its tax
base. 142 The employee portion of the payroll tax is 7.65 percent and applies to the first dollar of

136

Id. Built-in flexibility is different than elasticity of yield which is the ratio of the percentage change in tax to
the percentage change in income. GOODE, supra note 132, at 287. Elasticity is a measure of the tax system’s
progressivity – a proportional tax will have an elasticity of 1, a progressive tax of more than 1, and a regressive tax
of less than 1. Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers,
14(3) J. OF ECON. PERSP. 37, 40 (2000). Built-in flexibility is more relevant to income stabilization than is elasticity.
GOODE at 288; Auerbach & Feenberg at 40-1. However, both measures are mathematically related. See infra note
137.
137
Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 41. See also Lily Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives:
The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 62 (2006) (adopting nomenclature of normalized tax
change). It is also referred to as the “effective marginal tax rate” as it is equal to the product of the elasticity of
individual tax liability (the ratio of a proportionate change in tax to a proportionate change in income) and the
average tax rate. GOODE, supra note 132, at 287 n.2; J. P. Hutton & P. J. Lambert, Evaluating Income Tax Revenue
Elasticities, 90 ECON. J. 901 (1980). Built-in flexibility equals ∆T/∆Y, where T equals tax liability and Y equals
gross income, whereas elasticity equals % ∆T/ %∆Y and the average tax rate equals T/Y. Mathematically, elasticity
multiplied by the average tax rate will equal built-in flexibility. Id. See also Richard E. Slitor, The Measurement of
Progressivity and Built-In Flexibility, 62 Q. J. ECON., 309, 313 (1948); Robert M. Coen, Automatic Stabilizers, in
ENCY. OF TAX’N & TAX POL’Y 16, 17 (Joseph J. Cordes, et al. ed., 1999).
138
See I.R.C § 1.
139
HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 565 (2010) (defining a progressive tax as “one in which
a taxpayer’s average tax rate increases or decreases with income”).
140
PECHMAN, supra note 133, at 74. Progressive taxes also mitigate income increases by requiring a taxpayer
to pay a larger portion of their income in good years. Those with higher incomes find that their tax is increased
proportionately more than their income. Listokin, supra note 13, at 54.
141
Id.
142
“Payroll taxes” refers to the Social Security and Medicare taxes.
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wages up to the applicable taxable amount.143 A proportional tax can also mitigate earnings
losses but only in proportion to the marginal tax rate, not by more than the marginal tax as in a
progressive tax. 144 As wages drop, there is a reduction in the amount subject to tax (tax base),
but the tax rate applied to that reduced base remains the same. Hence, the percentage change to
post-tax income is directly equal to the marginal tax rate.
A progressive tax system is a more potent income stabilizer in the event of a salary loss than
a proportional tax system. Under a progressive tax, as earnings decline, both the tax base and
the tax rates drop; whereas, only the tax base is reduced under a proportionate tax. The result is
a larger offset to the lost salary under a progressive tax. Another way to consider the relative
ability of each type of tax system to act as a stabilizer is in terms of the stabilization ratio.145 For
any given change in pre-tax salary (denominator), the numerator (change in taxes) will be larger
under a progressive system (reflecting the change in base and rates) than under a proportionate
system (reflecting change in tax base only). 146
Figure 2 illustrates the 2013 income and payroll tax schedule for a female-headed household
containing two children. 147

143

The 7.65% tax rate is the combined rate for the employee portion of Social Security and Medicare. See SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET 2012 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES,
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2012.htm. The Social Security portion (OASDI) is 6.20% on
earnings up to the applicable taxable maximum amount. Id. The Medicare portion (HI) is 1.45% on all earnings.
Id. Only the employee portion is considered in this article because it directly affects disposable income (as
compared to the employer portion that indirectly affects disposable income to the extent wages are lowered to
account for it). Accord Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 137, at 42-43.
144
PECHMAN, supra note 133, at 13.
145
See text accompanying supra notes 134-135.
146
Accord Batchelder et al., supra note 137, at 62.
147
Calculated using inflation-adjusted income tax items. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, supra note 39. The basic
standard deduction for a head of household tax filer in 2013 was $8,950 and the personal exemption amount was
$3,900. Id. A single mother with two children would be entitled to three personal exemptions. See I.R.C. 151.
Accordingly, such a taxpayer would not be liable for positive income tax before credit until earnings reached
$20,650 ($8,950+ [3 * $3,900]). See Jonathan Barry Forman, 2009 Poverty Levels on Federal Tax Thresholds,
124(2) TAX NOTES 171, 172 (2009) (making similar calculation for 2009 for various types of taxpayers and calling it
the “simple income tax threshold”).
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FIGURE 2

In the event of an annual decline in earnings (moving down the earnings distribution from right
to left), positive tax payments are reduced as illustrated by lines ITBC (Income Tax Before
Credit) and PT (Payroll Tax). Notice PT is a straight line with a slope equal to the tax rate of
7.65 percent. A decline in earnings changes the tax base only, while the tax rate remains
constant. Compare this to ITBC’s kinked line. Each kink represents a change in marginal tax
rate and the slope between each kink is equal to the applicable marginal tax rate for that range of
earnings. Under ITBC, an earnings loss reduces the tax base and the average tax rate.

30

Please Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Permission

The following example is designed to illustrate how the income tax (progressive) and payroll
(proportionate) tax systems, respectively, operate to cushion household earnings losses. Myrna
is a single mother with two children. During 2012, Myrna earned $60,000. Myrna’s salary fell
to $30,000 in 2013. The following Table 2 summarizes the stabilization effects of the Federal
income and payroll tax systems with regard to Myrna.

Table 2: Myrna

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$60,000
$30,000
$30,000

Stabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax

Income Tax
$5,365
$935
$4,430

Payroll Tax
$4,590
$2,295
$2,295

Post-tax
Income
$50,045
$26,770
$23,275

22.42% ($6,725/$30,000)
14.77% ($4,430/$30,000)
7.65% ($2,295/$30,000)

Notice that Myrna’s earnings declined by $30,000 but her post-tax income declined by only
$23,275. 148 Earnings are stabilized by the tax system because the absolute amount of the fall in
post-tax income is less than the absolute amount of the fall in pre-tax earnings. 149 Overall, the
stabilization ratio was 22 percent. 150 This is in effect the percentage of the pre-tax earnings loss
that did not pass through to post-tax income. In other words, in the face of a $30,000 negative
wage drop, Myrna’s post-tax income declined by only $23,275 or by 78 percent of the loss. 151
With regard to the income tax, recall that under a progressive tax, income tax payments fall
by a greater percentage than the percentage change in earnings itself. This phenomenon is
148

Calculated using inflation-adjusted income tax items. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, supra note 39; Rev. Proc. 201152, 2011-45 I.R.B. 701 (assuming earnings are the only source of gross income and the only deductions are the
personal exemption and standard deduction and ignoring the child tax and other available credits).
149
See supra note 133.
150
Calculated as the change in taxes relative to the change in income or $6,725/$30,000.
151
Calculated as $23,275/$30,000.
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illustrated here: Myrna’s gross income declined by 50 percent while her income tax payments
fell by 83 percent. 152 Myrna moved from the 15 percent marginal rate bracket to the 10 percent
marginal rate bracket as a result of her salary loss. In effect, Myrna’s reduced income tax
payments cushioned about 15 percent of her earnings loss. 153 Myrna’s wage cut also resulted in
reduced payroll tax liability which offset an additional 7.65 percent of the decline. 154 Recall that
a proportional tax can cushion earnings losses but only in proportion to its tax rate.
b. Macroeconomic Level
Reduced tax payments precipitated by an earnings loss provide a source of nonlabor income,
buffering the effect of that pay cut on disposable income. 155 Since disposable income is a major
determinant of consumption, a household’s consumption may be more stable than it would be in
the absence of the income tax.156 This last point has macroeconomic implications when the
negative income shock is economy-wide, such as in a recession.

157

In that event, as personal

income declines, tax yields will automatically decline.

This can help spur an increase in

aggregate demand that can mitigate GNP declines. 158

In other words, “a key aspect of a

progressive income tax is providing collective insurance against [household-level] shocks to
152

Calculated as $30,000/$60,000 or a 50 percent decline in gross earnings versus $4,430/$5,365 or an 83
percent decline in income tax payments.
153
Calculated as the change in income taxes relative to the change in earnings or $4,430/$30,000.
154
The 7.65% tax rate is the combined rate for the employee portion of the Social Security and Medicare taxes.
The Social Security portion (OASDI) is 6.20% on wages up to the applicable taxable maximum amount. The
Medicare portion (HI) is 1.45% on all earnings. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 143.
155
DYNARKSI & GRUBER, supra note 132, at 260; Batchelder et al., supra note 137, at 59-60.
156
The degree of actual consumption smoothing depends on the share of liquidity-constrained and creditconstrained households. Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 44-46; KARTIK B. ATHREYA & AARON
STEELMAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Recipients, Labor Force
Participation,
and
Credit
Constraints,
Economic
Brief
No.
11-03
(2011),
available
at
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2011/pdf/eb_11-03.pdf; Batchelder et al., supra
note 137, at 61-65.
157
According to Pechman: “[t]oday it is understood that properly timed changes in tax yields can help increase
demand during recessions and restrain growth of demand during periods of expansion. One of the virtues of the
progressive individual income tax is that its yield automatically rises and falls more than in proportion to changes in
personal income. As a result, disposable income is more stable than it would be in the absence of the tax. Since
disposable income is a major determinant of consumption, expenditures of consumers are also more stable than they
would be without the tax.” PECHMAN, supra note 133, at 74.
158
PECHMAN, supra note 133, at 74-5. See also Listokin, supra note 13, at 54 (describing Keynesian roots of
this phenomenon).
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income, in turn smoothing consumption and dampening the business cycle.” 159 For this reason,
the tax system is referred to as an automatic stabilizer because it mitigates fluctuations in
economic activity without any explicit government action. 160
Auerbach and Feenberg calculated the ratio of the aggregate change in taxes to the aggregate
change in income (normalized tax change) as a result of a simulated 1 percent change in
aggregate income spread neutrally across the population for the years 1962 – 1995. 161

Over the

sample period, the Federal tax system (including income, payroll and EITC) offset between 23 to
32 percent of the change in pre-tax income. 162 Over a similar period, Dynarski and Gruber
calculated that changes in tax burdens offset 26 or 35 cents of each dollar of earnings variation,
depending on the data set used. 163 Batchleder et al. calculated the normalized tax change for a
downward shock to income in 2006 as 29 percent. 164
2. EITC as Income (De)Stabilizer
a. History
The income stabilization potential of the EITC played a role in its earliest history. In a sense,
the need for stability was the spark that ignited the EITC’s enactment. Although a “work bonus”
program akin to the EITC was originally proposed in 1972 as a pro-work alternative to
welfare, 165 the EITC was not enacted until 1975 as part a fiscal stimulus package meant to

159

Kniesner & Ziliak, Tax Reform, supra note 88, at 590.
Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 37; GOODE, supra note 132, at 286; PECHMAN, supra note 133, at
74. The transfer system is also a source of household income and consumption smoothing and automatic
stabilization. When income drops, not only do tax liabilities fall, but eligibility for government benefit rises.
Benefits provided under social insurance programs such as Unemployment Insurance (UI) and social assistance
programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) generally rise as incomes fall.
161
Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 41-2.
162
Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 43.
163
DYNARKSI & GRUBER, supra note 132, at 262 (using PSID for years 1976-1992 and CEX for years 19801993).
164
Batchhelder et al., supra note 137, at 63 tbl.1.
165
Ventry (2001), supra note 73, at 17.
160
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mitigate the effects of the 1975 recession. 166 The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (TRA75) included
a package of individual tax reductions, a refund of 1974 tax liability and an increase in the
standard deduction. 167 TRA 1975 also introduced the EITC, which was aimed at the working
poor, many of whom paid payroll taxes but not income taxes. 168 A refundable tax credit was
seen as a “kind of rebate of . . . [payroll] taxes for low-income workers.” 169 The House Ways
and Means committee stated that “[a]ppropriate tax reductions will also increase incomes, both
directly and through the multiplier effect.” 170 In a very real sense, “the EITC became law, not as
a part of a debate on social welfare legislation, but as a part of an effort to respond to a
recession.” 171

As in 1975, the United States recently faced recessionary periods renewing

interest in the potential of the EITC as an income stabilizer at both the macroeconomic and
household level.
b. Macroeconomic Level
In fact, only a very small amount of the macroeconomic automatic stabilization provided by
the tax system is attributable to the EITC. The Auerbach and Feenberg study cited above
estimated that the EITC contributed only about 1 percentage point to the overall normalized tax
change. 172 Batchelder et. al. determined that the normalized tax change for a downward shock to

166

H.R. Rep. No. 94-19, at 5 (1975) (“[t]he Tax Reduction Act of 1975 takes prompt and effective action to
check the drastic downward slide of our economy”).
167
Id. at 3-4.
168
Id.
169
S. Rep. No. 1230, at 425-6 (1972). See also S. Rep. No. 553, at 20 (1973) (“a new tax credit provision
which has the effect of refunding to low-income workers with children a large portion of the social security taxes
they pay”).
170
H.R. Rep. No. 94-19, at 8. The “multiplier effect” refers to the impact of an exogenous change in aggregate
demand on output and is derived from Keynesian macroeconomic theory. DARREL COHEN & GLENN FOLLETTE,
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE AUTOMATIC FISCAL STABILIZERS: QUIETLY DOING THEIR THING 5 (1999),
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1999/199964/199964pap.pdf. See generally Listokin, supra note 13, at 51-5
(linking Keynesian macroeconomic theory to the income tax).
171
See HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN (2003), supra note 46, at 13.
172
Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 41-2 (the normalized tax change was reduced from 23 to 32
percent to between 18 and 28 percent without the EITC or payroll taxes included).
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income was reduced by 1.7 percent when the refundability feature of the EITC was removed. 173
Recall that more than ¾ of the benefit of the EITC is in the form of a tax refund. 174 The small
role of the EITC with regard to macroeconomic stabilization is probably partially due to the
small percentage of the total taxpaying population entitled to claim the EITC in any given
year. 175 Furthermore, as described below, the EITC acts simultaneously as an income stabilizer
and destabilizer. 176 On a global scale, it may be that these two effects cancel each other out
resulting in an overall minimal macroeconomic stabilization effect from the EITC. 177
c. Household Level
The stabilization capabilities of the EITC at the individual household level are mixed. Recall
that the EITC reduces a recipient’s tax liability (nonrefundable portion) and/or provides a
payment to the recipient in the amount that the credit exceeds his or her tax liability (refundable
portion). In general, a liability reduction or an increased transfer payment can stabilize post-tax
income relative to pre-tax income in the event of an earnings decline. However, given the
unique shape of its benefit function, the stabilization properties of the EITC are not uniform
across its various regions.
Figure 3 introduces the EITC onto the 2013 tax schedule for a head of household taxpayer
with two children. 178

173

Batchelder et al., supra note 137, at 63 Table 1 (calculated assuming away refundability of the Child Tax
Credit as well). See generally I.R.C. § 24.
174
See supra note 48.
175
Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 1 (20 percent of total federal income tax returns claimed an EITC in tax year
2010).
176
See infra text accompanying notes 180-212.
177
Cf. Ximing Wu, Labor Supply and Income Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Welfare Programs
(Mar. 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://agecon2.tamu.edu/people/faculty/wu-ximing/public/eitc.pdf
(suggesting that the positive and negative labor supply incentives in the phasein versus phaseout range of the EITC
may cancel each other out resulting in a minimal overall labor supply effect from the program).
178
See supra notes 42, 147.
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FIGURE 3

Notice that unlike the income or payroll tax systems, the EITC’s marginal rate structure is
neither uniformly progressive nor proportionate. There is a negative marginal tax rate in the
EITC phasein region, in the flat region the marginal rate is zero, and a positive marginal tax rate
exists in the phaseout range. 179 As a result of this unique pattern of changing (in magnitude and
sign) marginal rates, the EITC amount could go up, down or remain the same in response to an
annual wage loss. As a result, it is impossible to say ex ante whether the EITC will stabilize,
destabilize or have no effect on post-tax income. It will depend on the taxpayer’s beginning
earnings (or AGI) level (in the relatively flush year) and ending earnings (or AGI) level (in the
year of the wage loss). An annual salary decline could make a taxpayer newly eligible for the
EITC, move the taxpayer within or across EITC ranges, or make a taxpayer newly ineligible for
the EITC.

The following subsections will describe how the EITC operates to stabilize or

destabilize post-tax income in these various scenarios.

179

See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
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i. Newly EITC Eligible
The EITC will offset a portion of any annual earnings decline that newly qualifies a taxpayer
for the EITC. 180 In this instance, the actual cushioning effect of the EITC will depend on the
relative value of the change in the EITC to the change in wages. 181 Since the change in EITC
will always be positive (and equal to the EITC amount in the income loss year) for a newlyqualified EITC recipient, the EITC will always offset a portion of the salary loss thereby
stabilizing post-tax income relative to pre-tax income.
Figure 4 shows a standard labor supply diagram with hours worked on the horizontal axis
and income on the vertical axis.
FIGURE 4

Income

Hours Worked

The EITC budget function is illustrated by the kinked budget line (ABCE). 182 The linear budget
line (AEF) is taxpayer’s budget line without the EITC. Assume an individual’s hours are
decreased so that pre-tax earnings decline from point F to Point D’. As earnings drop, the
180

All EITC recipients receive the credit as part of their annual tax refund check in the year following the year
in which they earned the income entitling them to the credit. This has two implications. First, the EITC is not
responsive to short-term (intra-annual) earnings fluctuations. Second, the EITC payment is temporally dislocated
from the need that precipitated it. This tempers the claim above that the EITC ‘offsets’ a particular year’s income
loss. See Greene, supra note 23 (for a detailed analysis of this timing problem).
181
See supra text accompanying note 135.
182
Figure 4 is not drawn to scale.
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individual moves onto the EITC budget line. Post-tax income would be at point D, which is
higher than pre-tax earnings of D’. The stabilization provided by the EITC is measured by the
difference between D’ and D relative to the difference between F and D’.
The Myrna example is updated in Table 3 to take into account the additional stabilization
effects of the EITC.

Table 3: Myrna (with EITC)

Earnings

Income Tax

Payroll Tax

EITC

Post-tax
Income

2012

$60,000

$5,365

$4,590

$0

$50,045

2013

$30,000

$935

$2,295

$2,746

$29,516

Δ

$30,000

$4,430

$2,295

$2,746

$20,529

Stabilization Ratio

31.57% ($9,471/$30,000)

Income Tax

14.77% ($4,430/$30,000)

Payroll Tax

7.65% ($2,295/$30,000)

EITC

9.15% ($2,746/$30,000)

Myrna did not qualify for the EITC in 2012 as her income was too high. 183 In 2013, after her
$30,000 salary decline, Myrna qualified for a $2,746 EITC. 184 Of the total EITC amount, $935
reduced her ITBC to zero (nonrefundable portion) and $1,811 was refunded to her upon the
filing of her 2013 tax return (refundable portion). The EITC offset the pre-tax earnings loss by
an additional 9 percent. After taking into account the additional cushioning provided by the
EITC, the Federal tax system stabilized Myrna’s post-tax income by 32 percent.
ii. Repeat EITC Claimants

183
184

In 2012, the completed phaseout amount was $41,952. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Calculated as $5,372 – [.2106* ($30,000-$17,530)]. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15, supra note 39.
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The next set of scenarios involves households that experience pay cuts that occur entirely
within the EITC eligibility range. This type of annual earnings loss will move a taxpayer along
the EITC schedule in Figure 3 from right to left (“reverse EITC function”). Under the reverse
EITC function, the EITC amount initially increases as earnings drop until the maximum credit
amount is reached. The EITC amount will remain at its maximum as wages fall within the
plateau region. The credit will then begin to decline as earnings decline within the phasein
region until both earnings and EITC amounts reach zero. The following subsections flesh out
the income stabilization effects of the various types of earnings losses occurring within the EITC
eligibility range.
(A) Losses within EITC Regions
(1) Within Phaseout: Marginal Stabilization
For an annual wage loss that occurs entirely within the EITC phaseout range, the increased
EITC amount will offset a portion of the loss thereby stabilizing post-tax income relative to pretax income. Within this range, the EITC effectively operates as a proportional tax with a rate
equal to the phaseout percentage (slope of phaseout line on reverse EITC function in Figure 3).
For a single mother with two children, each dollar of earnings decline between the completed
and threshold phaseout amounts result in an approximate 21 percent increase in the EITC
amount. 185 Alternatively, post-tax income goes down by only about 79 cents for each lost salary
dollar.

185

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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For example, assume Jenny’s (a single mother with two children) earnings fell from $40,000
in 2012 to $30,000 in 2013.

The following Table 4 demonstrates how the EITC, as part of the

Federal tax system, operated to stabilize Jenny’s post-tax income.

Table 4: Jenny

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$40,000
$30,000
$10,000

Income Tax
$2,365
$935
$1,430

Stabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

45.30%
14.30%
7.65%
23.35%

Payroll Tax
$3,060
$2,295
$765

EITC
$411
$2,746
$2,335

Post-tax
Income
$34,986
$29,516
$5,470

($4,530/$10,000)
($1,430/$10,000)
($765/$10,000)
($2,335/$10,000)

Jenny’s earnings dropped by $10,000 but her post-tax income declined by only $5,470 or by
approximately 55 percent of the salary loss. In effect, the tax system offset approximately 45
percent of Jenny’s wage drop. The EITC accounted for about one-half of this total tax-systeminduced income stabilization.
It is useful to analyze the impact of the various components of the Federal tax system for
relatively wealthy Myrna in Table 3 as compared to relatively less wealthy Jenny in Table 4. For
Myrna, the income tax is the most important income stabilizer. Jenny, on the other hand, realizes
more earnings loss offset from the EITC than from the income tax. Indeed, as earnings fall
below the simple income tax threshold of $20,650 in 2013 (see line ITBC in Figure 2), 186 the

186

See supra note 147.
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income tax’s contribution will cease, and the EITC and payroll tax will be the sole tax system
stabilizers. 187
(2) Within Plateau: No Stabilization
The EITC will not cushion any earnings decline that moves a taxpayer from a higher to a
lower pre-tax income level within the credit’s plateau region. Within this range, the credit
operates as a lump-sum subsidy unaffected in amount by changes in earnings. In both years, the
taxpayer would be entitled to the maximum credit amount. Since the subsidy amount is fixed, a
change in pre-tax income translates into an equivalent change in post-tax income. 188 Of course,
the EITC amount will change slightly between years because of the required annual inflation
adjustment. 189
For example, Halle’s (a single mother with two children) wages fell from $17,000 in 2012 to
$14,000 in 2013. The following Table 5 sets forth Halle’s post-tax position in both years as a
result of this wage loss.

Table 5: Halle

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$17,000
$14,000
$3,000

Income Tax
$0
$0
$0

Stabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

Payroll Tax
$1,301
$1,071
$230

EITC
$5,236
$5,372
$136

Post-Tax
Income
$20,936
$18,301
$2,635

12.18% ($366/$3,000)
N/A
7.65% ($230/$3,000)
4.53% ($136/$3,000)

187

See infra, e.g., Tables 5, 7 and 9.
Listokin, supra note 13, at 54.
189
See I.R.C. § 32(j).
188
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In this case, it appears that the EITC stabilized Halle by about 5 percent. However, the entire
stabilization provided by the EITC is related to the annual inflation adjustment, rather than a
change in earnings. 190
(3) Within Phasein: Marginal Destabilization
A transfer payment can only offset a pre-tax wage cut if the benefit amount increases as
earnings fall.

In other words, wages and transfers must move in opposite directions for

stabilization to occur. Within the EITC phasein region, the EITC amount and labor income
move in the same direction: the EITC amount declines as wages decline. As a result, the
absolute amount of the drop in post-tax income is larger than the drop in pre-tax earnings. 191 In
other words, the EITC phasein range is actually destabilizing to post-tax income. 192
For a two-child/single-parent household, each dollar of earned income lost in the phasein
region reduces the EITC amount by 40 percent (slope of phasein line EITC in Figure 3)193
resulting in a $1.40 post-tax income reduction for every dollar reduction in earnings. For
example, assume that Pat’s (a single mother with two children) earned income fell from $12,000
in 2012 to $10,000 in 2013.

190

Halle will of course see her payroll tax reduced and such reduction offsets her wage loss by an additional
7.65 percent.
191
Accord Listokin, supra note 13, at 77 (noting that while the phaseout is stabilizing, the credit itself is
destabilizing).
192
See Tuckman et al., Tax-Transfer Policy and the Temporal Stability of Household Income, 6 PUB. FIN. Q.
240, 241 (defining taxes and transfers as destabilizing if they “increase[e] the variation in household income over
what it would have been in their absence”).
193
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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The following Table 6 illustrates Pat’s post-tax income situation as a result of her withinphasein-range wage loss:

Table 6: Pat

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$12,000
$10,000
$2,000

Destabilization
Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

Income Tax
$0
$0
$0

-32.35%
N/A
7.65%
-40.00%

Payroll Tax
$918
$765
$153

EITC
$4,800
$4,000
$800

Post-Tax
Income
$15,882
$13,235
$2,647

(-$647/$2,000)
N/A
($153/$2,000)
($-800/$2,000)

Overall, Pat’s pre-tax earnings declined by $2,000, but her post-tax income declined by $2,647.
Lost EITC benefits exacerbated Pat’s underlying wage loss by 40 percent, an amount this article
refers to as the destabilization ratio. 194
Notice that the built-in flexibility of the EITC is marginally negative in the phasein region. 195
Negative built-in flexibility has been called “destabilizing or perverse flexibility.” 196

It is

associated with many subsidies since the total amount of the subsidy declines with a reduction in
the targeted activity. 197

Perverse flexibility within the EITC phasein range results from its

design as an earnings subsidy. While this may be an optimal design from a labor incentive
perspective, 198 it is problematic from an income stabilization point of view.

194

Calculated as EITC benefit reduction of $800/earnings reduction of $2,000. Counteracting this was the
7.65 percent stabilization provided by the payroll tax so that Pat’s net destabilization ration was only -32.5 percent.
195
Built-in flexibility may be either positive or negative. CARL S. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 552 (2009).
196
David W. Lusher, The Stabilizing Effectiveness of Budget Flexibility, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.,
POLICIES TO COMBAT DEPRESSION 77, 85 (1956).
197
SHOUP, supra note 194, at 552.
198
See Saez, supra note 4.
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(B) Losses Across Regions
(1) Phaseout to Flat: Stabilization
The EITC will also mitigate the impact of an annual earnings loss that moves a taxpayer from
the phaseout to the flat region on the reverse EITC function in Figure 3. The stabilization ratio
for this type of earnings decline will always be less than 21 percent because a portion of the loss
occurs in the 21 percent marginal rate range (phaseout) and the rest occurs in the 0 percent
marginal rate range (flat).
For example, assume Sandrina’s (a single mother with two children) salary declined from
$27,000 in 2012 (phaseout) to $15,000 in 2013 (flat), for a total earnings loss of $12,000.

The

following Table 7 illustrates how the EITC offset this wage drop.

Table 7: Sandrina

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$27,000
$15,000
$12,000

Stabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

Income Tax
$690
$0
$690
31.93%
5.75%
7.65%
18.53%

Payroll Tax
$2,066
$1,148
$918

EITC
$3,149
$5,372
$2,223

Post-Tax
Income
$27,393
$19,225
$8,169

($3,831/$12,000)
($690/$12,000)
($918/$12,000)
($2,223/$12,000)

In this case, Sandrina’s EITC amount increased from $3,149 in 2012 to the maximum 2013
EITC amount of $5,372, cushioning 19 percent of Sandrina’s pre-tax earnings drop.

By

comparison, if Sandrina’s $12,000 wage decline occurred entirely within the phaseout range, the
EITC would offset about 21 percent of the loss. The only general statement that can be made is
that a taxpayer with more wage loss focused in the phaseout range than in the flat range will
realize greater income stabilization than a taxpayer with the opposite pattern of loss.
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(2) Flat to Phasein: Destabilization
If an annual earnings decline moves a taxpayer from the flat to the phasein region of the
reverse EITC function, the reduced credit amount will destabilize post-tax income. In this case,
the destabilization ratio will be more than 0 but less than 40 percent, with income destabilization
at its highest the more of the earnings loss that is concentrated in the EITC phasein as opposed to
flat range.
For example, assume Karla (a single mother with two children) earned $15,000 in 2012 but
only $10,000 in 2013. The following Table 8 illustrates how the EITC exacerbated Karla’s wage
loss:

Table 8: Karla

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000

Destabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

Income Tax
$0
$0
$0

Payroll Tax
$1,148
$765
$383

EITC
$5,236
$4,000
$1,236

Post-Tax
Income
$19,089
$13,235
$5,854

-17.07% ($-854/$5,000)
N/A
7.65% ($383/$5,000)
-24.72% ($-1,236/$5,000)

As a result of Karla’s $5,000 earnings loss, her EITC amount decreased by $1,236, exacerbating
the post-tax income effect of the pre-tax salary decline by 25 percent. 199 As suggested above, the
income destabilization ratio for Karla’s flat-to-phasein wage drop (25 percent) was less than the
income destabilization for a purely within-phasein-range earnings reduction (40 percent). 200

199

Counteracting this was the 7.65 percent stabilization provided by the payroll tax so that Karla’s net
destabilization was only -12 percent.
200
See supra note 194.
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(3) Phaseout to Phasein: (De)Stabilization?
For a an annual wage decline that moves a taxpayer from the phaseout to the phasein range
of the EITC, it is not possible ex ante to determine whether post-tax income will be stabilized,
destabilized or unaffected by the earnings drop. The EITC amount may be the same, more, or
less in the year of the salary loss. The result would depend on where in the phaseout range the
taxpayer started in the relatively flusher year (Year 1) and where he or she landed in the phasein
range in the relatively leaner year (Year 2).
A few general observations can be made. First, at any given Year 1 level of earnings in the
phaseout range, the lower the Year 2 earnings level in phasein range, the less (more) income
stabilization (destabilization) will occur. For example, assume that in 2012 Mary (a single
mother with two children) earned $27,000 and properly claimed $3,149 in EITC benefits. 201 The
following Table 9 illustrates the level of stabilization or destabilization from the EITC caused by
various potential 2013 earnings levels.
Table 9: Mary
(Assuming 2012 Earnings of $27,000 and EITC of $3,149)
2013
Earnings
$13,000
$11,000
$9,000
$7,000
$5,000
$3,000
$1,000

2013
EITC
$5,200
$4,400
$3,600
$2,800
$2,000
$1,200
$400

Change
EITC
$2,051
$1,251
$451
($349)
($1,149)
($1,949)
($2,749)

Change
Earnings
$14,000
$16,000
$18,000
$20,000
$22,000
$24,000
$26,000

(De)Stabilization
Ratio
15%
8%
3%
-2%
-5%
-8%
-11%

Second, for any given reduction in earnings, moving from a very high (low) Year 1 earned
income level in the phaseout range to a very high (low) Year 2 earned income level in the

201

Calculated as $5,236 – [.2106*($27,000-$17,090)]. See Rev. Proc. 2011-52, supra note 148.
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phasein range will maximize the income stabilization (destabilization) effect of the EITC as the
change in EITC amount will be greatest for this particular type of phaseout-to-phasein earnings
loss. For example, assume that Janet’s (a single mother with two children) wages declined by
$27,000 between 2012 and 2013. If she moved from a pre-tax income level of $40,000 (high
phaseout level) in 2012 to $13,000 in 2013 (high phasein level), then her EITC amount would
increase from $411 202 to $5,200 203 and offset about 18 percent of her wage loss. 204 If instead
Janet moved from an earned income level of $30,000 in 2012 (mid-phaseout level) to $3,000 in
2013 (mid-phasein level), then her credit amount would increase by $1,317 205 and only stabilize
about 5 percent of her income. 206
This pattern of income (de)stabilization derives directly from the rapidly changing (in
magnitude and sign) marginal rate structure of the EITC in Figure 3. 207 Although designed to
provide a targeted wage subsidy to low-income workers, it is likely that the seemingly irrational
pattern of income (de)stabilization is an unintended by-product of that design.
iii. Newly EITC Ineligible
Long-term unemployment could make a taxpayer newly ineligible for the EITC. 208 In that
event, the taxpayer would lose not only positive earned income, but also positive EITC benefits.
As described above, income destabilization occurs when earnings and subsidies move in the

202

Calculated as $5,236 – [.2106*($40,000-$17,090)]. See Rev. Proc. 2011-52, supra note 148.
Calculated as $13,000*.4. See supra Table 1.
204
Calculated as change in EITC ($4,789)/change in earnings ($27,000).
205
Janet would be entitled to an EITC of $2,517 in 2012 ($5,236 – [.2106*($30,000-$17,090)]) and $1,200
($3,000*.4) in 2013. See Rev. Proc. 2011-52, supra note 148; Table 1.
206
Calculated as $1,317 (change in EITC)/$27,000 (change in earnings).
207
See supra note 178.
208
A taxpayer who became unemployed in a year (relatively wealthier year) and remained unemployed
throughout the next year (relatively leaner year with no other W-2 or self-employment income) would be the
prototype for this type of earnings loss.
203
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same direction. 209 The extent of destabilization would depend on the value of the lost EITC
benefits relative to lost wages.
For example, assume Gina (a single mother with two children) lost her job in the middle of
2012 and remained unemployed for all of 2013. Prior to losing her job, Gina earned $15,000 in
2012. The following Table 10 illustrates how lost EITC benefits exacerbated Gina’s post-tax
income loss.

Table 10: Gina

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$15,000
$0
$15,000

Destabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

Income Tax
$0
$0
$0

Payroll Tax
$1,148
$0
$1,148

EITC
$5,236
$0
$5,236

Post-Tax
Income
$19,089
$0
$19,089

-27.26% ($-4,089/$15,000)
N/A
7.65% ($1,148/$15,000)
-34.91% ($-5,236/$15,000)

In this case, Gina’s earnings and EITC amount fell by $15,000 and $5,236, respectively. Lost
EITC benefits destabilized Gina’s post-tax income by 35 percent.
d. Summary
To summarize, the EITC phaseout range provides marginal stabilization benefits, the plateau
region provides no income stabilization, and the phasein range marginally destabilizes post-tax
income relative to pre-tax income.

The Auerbach and Feenberg study cited above is in

accord. 210 Focusing only on the contribution of the EITC to the overall automatic stabilization
provided by the tax system, the authors concluded that the “[EITC] reduce[d] the impact of
taxation for [the] lowest [income] quintile, but raise[d] it for the second quintile, and in more
209
210

See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 136, at 44 tbl. 1.
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recent years, the third quintile, where taxpayers in the phaseout range dominate[d] those
receiving additional subsidy.” 211 In other words, in the phasein range [lowest quintile], the EITC
destabilizes thereby “reducing the impact of taxation” while in the phaseout range [second and
third quintile], the EITC mitigates the effect of income losses (thereby “raising” the impact of
taxation). 212
This pattern of EITC income (de)stabilization is a by-product of the design of the EITC as a
targeted wage subsidy. The EITC phaseout reduces the payoff from working more within a year,
but it also eases income losses for those confronted with an annual earnings declines.

In

contrast, the wage subsidy provided in the phasein region increases the payoff from working
more within a given year, but it also exacerbates annual wage losses. Just as the actual impact of
the EITC’s intra-annual work incentives depends, in part, on the location of a beneficiary on the
EITC schedule (household-level) or the relative distribution of all beneficiaries across the
schedule (macroecomic-level), so too with the EITC’s inter-annual income stabilization effects.
This affects the ability of the EITC to serve as a safety net for all of its beneficiaires.
B. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
This Section B. draws out the normative implications of the “EITC as Safety Net” paradigm
through the lens of its likely winners and losers.
1. The Good: Myrna
Myrna is the clear winner under the analysis outline in Section A. above. Recall that Myrna
(Table 3) suffered an annual earnings loss that made her newly eligible for the EITC phaseout
region. The credit amount stabilized Myrna’s post-tax income by offsetting a portion of her
211

Id. at 44. For example, in 1995 the EITC reduced the first quintile’s normalized tax response (as compared
to the income tax without the EITC) by .04 but it increased the second and third quintile’s normalized tax response
(as compared to the income tax without the EITC) by .04 each. Id.
212
Accord Dowd, supra note 27, at 820 (associating economic variables with the probability of claiming the
EITC and finding that his results were “roughly consistent with Auerbach and Feenberg . . . that the EITC acts
cyclically for the first quintile . . . and counter-cyclically for the second and third quintiles. . .”).
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wage decline. 213 A new study suggests that Myrna represents the protypical EITC recipient, at
least when the program is viewed over time. Dowd and Horowitz studied households’ utilization
of the EITC over an 18-year period from 1989 to 2006. 214 The authors demonstrated that for a
majority of EITC claimants, the EITC served as a source of temporary earnings loss offset, rather
than as a long-term income maintenance or work incentive program. 215 A total of 42 percent of
claimants in the study had an EITC spell that lasted only one year, and 61 percent of EITC
recipients claimed the credit for 2 years or less. 216 A “spell” refers to the duration of continuous
time on the EITC measured in years. The 42 percent figure relating to single-year EITC spells
tracks closely with a study focused, inter alia, on the ability of families with children
experiencing large intra-annual income drops to recover from such drops in the following
year. 217 Acs et. al. reported that 2 out of 5 (40 percent) of individuals whose monthly family
income fell by 50 percent or more made a full recovery within a year. 218

213

Given her squarely middle-income salary level, Myrna may also be able to seek additional income
stabilization from UI. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-341, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH BENEFIT RECEIPT (2006); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-071147, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: LOW-WAGE AND PART-TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES
OF RECEIPT (2007).
214
Dowd & Horowitz, supra note 27. This study used a sample of individual income tax returns filed between
1989 and 2006 that actually claimed the EITC, focusing for the most part on tax returns that claimed a dependent
child. Id. at 648.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 11, tbl. 2. The EITC claim length was slightly longer than an earlier study by Horowitz. Horowitz,
supra note 27, at 338. This earlier study found that 74 percent of newly-eligible EITC families lost their eligibility
in two years or less. Id. The difference between the two studies can be accounted for by the use of different time
periods and data sets. The earlier study by Horowitz used data taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for the years 1975-1992. Id. at 336. Dowd and Horowitz captured the period 1989-2006 and used tax
return data of actual claimants. Dowd & Horowitz, supra note 27, at 631. A third study by Dowd for the period
1989 to 2003 was roughly consistent with Horowitz, finding that 41 percent of EITC recipients received the credit
for one or two years, and that 49 percent receive the credit for three years or fewer. Dowd, supra note 27, at 816.
Dowd used a data set called the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) which is a random panel of individual
tax returns created by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS for the period 1989-2003. Id. at 813.
217
GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE URBAN INST., Risk and Recovery: Documenting the Changing Risks to Family
Incomes, Brief 4 (May, 2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411890_risk_and_recovery.pdf (used data from
1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of SIPP).
218
Id.
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Although the duration of most EITC spells was short, the frequency of those spells was fairly
high. According to Dowd & Horowitz, approximately 45 percent of those EITC recipients who
did not receive the EITC for 1 year claimed the EITC again in the next year and 35 percent of
those who did not receive the EITC for 2 years received it again in the third year. 219 In other
words, there was considerable churning, with most taxpayers claiming the credit for short
frequent spells. 220
An important question is what triggered these households to claim the EITC, albeit for a
short time.

Studying the years 1975-1992, Horowitz demonstrated that a majority

(approximately 53 percent) of families who became newly-eligible for the EITC did so because
of lowered earnings, rather than increased earnings (19 percent) or a change in family structure
(16 percent). 221 This data suggests that EITC take-up rates, over time, should be affected more
by the income stabilization potential of the EITC than the work incentive aspect. Even more
telling was that a majority (approximately 57 percent) of families became newly eligible for the
EITC phasein region because of lowered earnings rather than increased earnings. 222 Indeed,
earnings decreases caused more than twice as many taxpayers to become newly phasein-eligible
as compared to earnings increases. 223 Thus, the earnings loss offset aspect of the EITC may be
important even in the phasein range. This is particularly problematic as the phasein range is
marginally destabilizing in response to wage declines. 224
Dowd analyzed EITC usage for a sample of taxpayers who were observed for three years in
each three-year period from 1989 to 2003. For those who did not claim the credit in year 1,
219

Dowd & Horowitz, supra note 27, at 632.
Id.
221
Horowitz, supra note 27, at 344 tbl. 9 (using data from PSID from 1975-1992).
222
Id. at 345. This figure includes families who were previously in the phaseout or flat ranges of the EITC
schedule, as well as those earning too much to qualify for the EITC. Id.
223
Id. at 344 tbl. 9.
224
See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
220
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claiming the EITC only in year 2 or 3 was associated with, inter alia, a decline in wages. 225
Specifically, Dowd observed that those taxpayers who did not claim the credit in the first year,
but who claimed it in only the 2nd or only the 3rd year, “experienced substantial shocks in their
wage income of, on average, about a quarter of their first year income. For these taxpayers, the
EITC made up about one-sixth of the decline in their wage income.” 226
More recent tax return data from 2009 (the peak of the recession) suggests that the EITC
played an income stabilization role during the Great Recession. In tax year (TY) 2009 (the peak
of the recession), approximately 27 million taxpayers claimed the EITC, an increase of 9.2
percent from TY 2008. 227

Compare this to the nominal increase in EITC claimants from TY

2007 to TY 2008 of only .7 percent. 228

Approximately 25 million taxpayers claimed the

refundable portion of the EITC in TY 2009, an increase of 14.6 percent from TY 2008. 229 From
TY 2007 to TY 2008, the number of taxpayers claiming the refundable portion of the EITC rose
by only .6 percent.

This is not surprising given the fact that salaries and wages (the largest

proportion of EITC recipients’ earned income) 230 increased slightly between TY 2007 and TY
2008 by 1.9 percent, but fell from TY 2008 to TY 2009 by 4.1 percent. 231 As more taxpayers
move down the income distribution due to wage declines, more qualified for the refundable
portion of the EITC.

225

Dowd, supra note 216 at 819.
Id. at 819-820.
227
JUSTIN BRYAN, I.R.S., INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2009, 12 (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11infallbulincome.pdf [hereinafter IRS 2009].
228
JUSTIN BRYAN, I.R.S., INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2008, 13 (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08fallbul.pdf [hereinafter IRS 2008]
229
IRS 2009, supra note 227, at 13 fig. H.
230
See, e.g., id. at 53 tbl. 4 (in 2009 salaries and wages accounted for 90 percent of total earned income, while
self-employment income accounted for only 10 percent); THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42131,CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG TAX FILERS BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006: THE ROLE OF
LABOR INCOME, CAPITAL INCOME, AND TAX POLICY 5 tbl. 1 (2011) (showing that wages and salaries make up 82
percent of total income for the bottom 80 percent of the income distribution in 2006).
231
IRS 2008, supra note 228, at 7 fig. B; IRS 2009, supra note 227, at 6 fig. B.
226
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Taken together, this data paints a very different portrait of the EITC program than the “antiwelfare/anti-poverty” historical narrative in Part I, above. Viewed as a snapshot of a particular
year, the program operates as a work subsidy/income transfer program aimed at poor single
mothers like Pat and Gina. However, the Dowd & Horowitz study suggests that, over time, it
operates primarily as an income stabilization program for middle-class families (like Myrna’s)
suffering temporary earnings setbacks.
Intertemporal EITC analyses focus on the movement of households into and out of the
program. An EITC claimant in any particular year may be there only temporarily due to a
negative shock to income (Myrna) or may be a repeat or continual claimant (Pat). In contrast to
the majority of EITC claimants who cycle on and off the program frequently, Dowd & Horowitz
estimated that 20 percent of recipients are long-term EITC claimants (after starting a spell
claimed the credit for 5 years or more). 232 A GAO study is also in accord, finding that over the
five year period between tax years 1999-2005, only about 20 percent of EITC claimants were
continual filers, the rest were intermittent (29%), one-time (24 percent), discontinued (19%), or
first-time (8 percent) filers. 233
The breakdown of EITC claimants into continual versus intermittent users parallels closely
with the categories of poverty (chronic vs. transient) delineated in the dynamic poverty literature
(study of spells of poverty over time). 234 Chronic poverty can be defined as a standard of living

232

See Dowd & Horowitz, supra note 27, at 621.
TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM HAS MADE
ADVANCES; HOWEVER, ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE METHODS ARE NEEDED TO STOP BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS IN ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS, REF. NO. 2009-40-024, 2 (2008). “Intermittent” filers included those that
“claim[ed] the EITC in one year but not the next, then file[d] and claim[ed] the credit again at a later time.” Id. at 2
n.6. Discontinued filers included those “who had consistently claimed[ed] the EITC but who stopped filing a tax
return or no longer qualified for the EITC.” Id. at 2 n.7.
234
See, e.g., POVERTY DYNAMICS, supra note 26; Bane & Ellwood, supra note 26; Hulme et al., supra note 26.
233
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below the relevant poverty line for an extended period of time. 235 Transient poverty includes the
churning poor (standard of living at or near the poverty line who are poor in some periods but not
others) and occasionally poor (standard of living above the poverty line but who have
experienced at least one period in poverty). 236 Since most of the effects of the EITC are
concentrated around the poverty line, 237 one can analogize movements onto and off of the EITC
to movements in and out of poverty. The majority of EITC claimants who cycle on and off the
program frequently, like Myrna, track closely with the category of transient poor; whereas,
continual EITC claimants, like Pat, can be analogized to the chronic poor.
The point of categorizing the poor, and by analogy EITC claimants, in the dynamic poverty
literature is to recognize that different policies have different implications for each
subcategory. 238 The goal is to formulate programs that can improve the position of the chronic
poor by raising incomes at the bottom of the earnings distribution and reduce the probability of
the transient poor falling into poverty in times of economic distress. 239 Both types of policies are
“antipoverty” but they are aimed at different potential beneficiaries and operate through different
mechanisms.

235

David Hulme & Andrew Shepherd, Conceptualizing Chronic Poverty, 31(3) WORLD DEV. 403, 405 (2003).
The authors suggested five years as the correct period but admit that five years was an arbitrary and crude
approximation for long-term deprivation. Id. Accord Martin Ravallion et al., Testing a Social Safety Net, 57 J.
PUB. ECON. 175, 175-6 (1995). The five year period was defended on three grounds: 1) it is a significant period of
time in a person’s life in most cultures; 2) data collection often happens in five-year intervals; and 3) some empirical
studies indicate that people who stay poor for five years will likely remain poor for the rest of their live. Hulme &
Shepherd at 405.
236
Id.
237
Liebman, supra note 46, at 91-4 (1998); Meyer, supra note 47, at 159.
238
Jyostsna Jalan & Martin Ravallion, Is Transient Poverty Different? Evidence From Rural China, 36 J. OF
DEV. STUD. 82, 83 (2000). See also Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 1 (providing that two features of safety net
programs are: (1) to raise incomes at the bottom of the income distribution and (2) increase protection in times of
need).
239
Ravallion et al., supra note 235, at 175-76; Hulme & Shepherd, supra note 235, at 406. Accord Bitler et al.,
supra note 18, at 1.
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The EITC is unique in that it can potentially perform both antipoverty functions within a
single program. The work subsidy in the phasein range increases the incomes of continual EITC
claimants, while the phaseout range stabilizes the incomes of intermittent EITC filers. While
previous analyses of the antipoverty effectiveness of the EITC focused on the chronic poor
(detailing how many children or single mothers are promoted out of poverty by claiming the
credit), 240 the Dowd & Horowitz study illustrated that the EITC can also prevent the transient
poor from falling into poverty.
However, the ability of the EITC to simultaneously assist both categories of claimants
depends crucially on a strong economy. During economic downturns, when wages are falling or
jobs lost, the EITC continues to offer safety net protection to the (increased number) of transient
poor (like Myrna), but loses its ability to assist the chronic poor (like Pat and Gina).
2. The Bad: Pat
Pat is a clear loser under the EITC as safety net model. Recall that Pat (Table 6) remained in
the EITC phasein range both before and after her annual pay cut and as a result the EITC
destabilized her post-tax income. This is a direct consequence of the design of the phasein
region of the EITC as a wage subsidy.

Wage subsidies are inherently destabilizing – they

amplify both wage increases and wage decreases. Recall that in the 1990s, earnings plus EITC
put single mothers in a better post-tax economic situation than remaining unemployed and/or on
welfare. However, with the economic downturns of the early 2000s, rather than improving Pat’s
post-tax income situation, the EITC worsened it.

In other words, the EITC helped Pat when

240

See, e.g., Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 1 (providing that in 2011 the EITC lifted 4.7 million children out of
poverty); Meyer, supra note 47, at 159 (providing that in 2007 the EITC lifted about 1.1 million families and over
2.1 million children above the poverty line). But see Phyllis Jeroslow, The Earned Income Credit as an AntiPoverty Program:
Palliative or Cure?, July 18, 2012, available at http://www.socialpolicy.org.uk/lincoln2012/Jeroslow%20P8.pdf (arguing that these snapshots antipoverty statistics overstate the
antipoverty effectiveness of the EITC program because the official poverty line is an inadequate measure and
reflects short-term gains that do not result in upward mobility for EITC beneficiaries).
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economic times were good and hurt her when economic times were bad. Notice this is the exact
opposite response pattern one would want in a safety net program. By definition, a safety net
program should increase protection in recessionary periods. 241
Empirical data illustrates how the EITC failed to offset the effects of the 2001 recession for
poor female-headed households. Using data reported by the CBO, 242 Bernstein compared the
real income of low-income (first quintile) single-mother families during the 1990s to the early
2000s, including data on the 2001 recession. 243 Bernstein demonstrated that during the 1990s,
low-income single-mother families enjoyed large real income gains (4.3 percent), driven by large
annual increases in earnings (10.4 percent) and an expansion of the EITC (18.2 percent) that was
enough to overcome a reduction in welfare benefits (-11.9 percent). However, the earnings and
EITC trends reversed during the period 2000-2005, which included the 2001 recession and
associated jobless recovery. Low-income single-mother families’ real annual income fell (-2.6
percent) as a result of not only reduced earnings (-3.8 percent) but also reduced EITC benefits (3.6 percent). 244 Bernstein concluded that during the economic downturn of the early 2000s, the
EITC functioned in a pro-cyclical (moving in sync with business cycles) manner for low-income
single mothers thus failing as a safety net program. 245

241

Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 2.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 110TH CONG., PUB. NO. 2602, CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF LOWINCOME HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN (2007),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8113/05-16-low-income.pdf.
243
JARED BERNSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., A TALE OF TWO TIME PERIODS FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES (June 6,
2007), http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_20070606/.
244
Id.
245
JEFF CHAPMAN & JARED BERNSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., FALLING THROUGH THE SAFETY NET LOWINCOME SINGLE MOTHERS IN THE JOBLESS RECOVERY, ISSUE BRIEF 191, 2 (2003). See also Listokin, supra note 13,
at 77 (indicating that from a macroeconomic perspective the EITC phasein is destabilizing or acts in procyclical
manner and the phaseout is stabilizing or acts in a countercyclical manner); Dowd, supra note 216, at 820 (“the
EITC acts cyclically for the first quintile . . . and counter-cyclically for the second and third quintiles”).
242
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Prior to reform, the phaseout range of traditional welfare programs generally overlapped with
the EITC phasein range and neutralized the effects of EITC income destabilization.246
However, post-reform welfare failed to play this role during the 2001 and 2008 recessions.
TANF benefits declined during the 2001 recession (-6.5 percent) albeit at a slower rate than in
the 1990s. 247 During the Great Recession, the unemployment rate increased by 88 percent while
national TANF caseloads increased by only 14 percent. 248 In some 13 states, welfare caseloads
actually dropped between 2007 and 2010. 249

This data suggests that the 1996 reforms

(particularly the work requirement and block-grant financing) converted welfare from a
countercyclical program (designed to counteract business cycle downturns) into a pro-cyclical
program. 250
The lack of a cash safety net for low-income female household heads (like Pat) is particularly
problematic as these women are the least able to offset earnings losses through other
mechanisms. As a result, it is likely that wage declines associated with the recent recessions
negatively impacted this fragile subpopulation’s economic well-being. Generally, the important
variable in individual or household welfare is not income per se, but the effect that changes on
income have on consumption. 251 There are a variety of mechanisms a household can access to in

246

Cf. Shaviro, supra note 12, 462 (providing that “the EITC’s negative tax rate in the positive subsidy range
offsets what would otherwise be exceptionally high marginal tax rates, due mainly to the phaseout of social welfare
benefits”). See also in green book I think in intro –look up
247
See supra note 245.
248
Id. The authors speculate that UI may have displaced TANF for some low-income single parents and that
some states actively discouraged applicants from enrolling in welfare. Id.
249
Id. at 2. See also Sam Syverson, State TANF Cuts Break Promises, Leave Families Disconnected, NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CENTER BLOG (Oct. 12, 2011), www.nwlc.org/our-blog/state-tanf-cuts-break-promises-leavefamilies-disconnected.
250
See, e.g., supra note 245; BITLER & HOYNES, supra note 107, at 4 (finding evidence that welfare may be less
responsive to business cycles downturns than before reform).
251
There are two different strands of literature on consumption behavior: (1) the complete markets hypothesis
and (2) the permanent income hypothesis. Blundell et al., Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance, 98 AM.
EC. REV. 1887, 1888 (1998); Dynarski & Gruber, supra note 132, at 235-7. The complete markets hypothesis
assumes that consumption is fully insured against idiosyncratic shocks to income, both transitory and permanent. Id.
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order to insulate consumption from wage losses. According to Blundell, at each step in the
transformative process of converting wages to consumption, families invoke a number of
strategies to deal with income risk. 252 The link between hourly wage rate and earnings is hours,
so an individual can increase income by increasing labor supply. 253 Increasing hours may not be
an option for a single parent like Pat, whose responsibilities include not only earning wages, but
also caring for young children and running a household.

Even if Pat could take on additional

hours, they may be unavailable during recessionary periods.
The link between individual earnings and family earnings is family labor supply. In response
to an earnings loss to one family member, other family members can increase their labor supply
to offset the decline. 254 Married couples may be able to reallocate work, care giving, and other
household responsibilities to allow one spouse to increase hours worked in response to an
earnings shock. There is no partner to pick up the slack when Pat’s hours and earnings are
reduced as a result of an economic downturn.
The tax (including EITC) and transfer system operate on earnings to convert them to
disposable income. 255 On the tax side, Pat’s disposable income was negatively impacted by the
EITC because of marginal phasein income destabilization.256 On the transfer side, there are two
other major cash income stabilization programs: TANF and UI. As described above, in the post-

If there is full consumption insurance than idiosyncratic variation in family recourses should not be reflected in
family consumption. Id. This hypothesis is generally empirically rejected. Id. The permanent income hypothesis,
on the other hand, suggests that permanent variations in income should be reflected in consumption, but not
transitory variation which should be absorbed through saving or dissaving. Id. The permanent income hypothesis
draws a sharp distinction between transitory and permanent variation in income; the latter would be reflected in
consumption decisions while the former should not. Id. This hypothesis is also rejected in both aggregate and micro
data, as consumption either reacts too little to permanent income shocks or exhibits excess sensitivity with respect to
transitory shocks. Id.
252
Richard Blundell, From Income to Consumption, 28 FOCUS 23 (2011).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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reform era, TANF was increasingly unavailable or underutilized by single mothers. 257
Numerous studies indicate that low-wage workers receive UI benefits significantly less
frequently than other workers. 258 Accordingly, it is unlikely Pat can rely on transfer programs to
cushion her wage loss.
Even if TANF and UI were available to Pat, it is unlikely that the amount of these
countercyclical stabilizers would counteract the loss of earnings and EITC benefits. 259 Kniesner
& Ziliak compared the “explicit insurance” provided by programs such as Social Security, UI,
TANF, and SNAP to the “implicit income insurance” provided by the tax system (including
federal and state income taxes, federal payroll taxes, and the EITC). 260 They demonstrated that
across all income quintiles, including the lowest where Pat resides, the tax system did as much to
stabilize income implicitly as did transfer programs explicitly and taxes did more to reduce
consumption variability than did transfer payments. 261
Finally, there are a number of self-insurance (saving/borrowing) and informal insurance
mechanisms (transfers from family members/friends) available to Pat to smooth consumption in
the face of her wage decline. 262 Poor female-headed households probably cannot access these

257

See supra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1147, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: LOW-WAGE
AND PART-T IME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES OF RECEIPT 19 (2007) (providing that “although
low-wage workers were almost two-and-one-half times as likely to be out of work as higher-wage workers, they
were about half as likely to receive UI benefits”). There is evidence that single mothers increasingly accessed
unemployment insurance (UI) during the most recent economic downturn to boost their nonlabor income. See
ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., supra note 107, at 1.
259
See ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., supra note 107, at 1.
260
Kniesner & Ziliak, Implicit Insurance, supra note 13.
261
Id. at 12, 14. Transfers reduced consumption volatility by about 8.5 percent on average, and taxes reduced
consumption variations by an additional 10 percent. Id. at 14. Note that transfers included government programs as
well as private transfers. Id. at 11.
262
Blundell, supra note 252; Stefan Dercon, Income Risk, Coping Strategies and Safety Nets, 17 WORLD BANK
RES. OBS. 141 (2011). Self-insurance includes precautionary savings (building up assets in high earnings years and
applying those savings in low earnings years). Id. at 3.
258
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self-insurance tools because of credit/liquidity constraints and/or lack of saving. 263 During
recessionary periods, family and friends may be unable to gift or loan money due to their own
negative financial circumstances. As a result, the EITC may be the only cash-based safety net
available to Pat.

This makes recession-induced phasein range destabilization particularly

problematic.
A recent paper by Bitler et al. analyzed the relationship between business cycles and the size
of the EITC program. The study found that overall EITC participation increased 1.8 percent in
response to a one percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate. 264 However, when
this figure was decomposed by demographic group, a familiar result emerged. For married
couples with children, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate resulted in a 6.3
percent increase in EITC caseloads. 265 Recall that a majority of married couples reside in the
phaseout range. 266 In contrast, single parent caseloads actually went down by 1 percent in
response to an increase in the unemployment level. 267 Single parent families dominate the
phasein range. 268 In other words, the EITC is countercyclical for married couples who fall onto
the EITC schedule as a result of an earnings loss but is pro-cyclical and provides no automatic
stabilization or income protection for single parent families. 269
The implicit social bargain made by the government during safety net reform of the 1990s
was that if you work we will take care of you. Despite a historically bad labor market, Pat
managed to remain employed. She held up her end of the bargain during both good and bad
263

EDMISTON, supra note 271, at 49 (reporting survey results suggesting that low- and moderate-income
families lack access to traditional forms of credit and that since the financial crisis, these same families have had
even greater difficulty accessing credit because of tightened credit standards).
264
Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 16, 28 tbl. 2 (data from the 1996-2008 SOI).
265
Id. (estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level).
266
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
267
Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 16, 28 tbl. 2 (estimate shows negative but statistically insignificant
coefficients).
268
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
269
Bitler et al., supra note 18, at 24.
60

Please Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Permission

economic times. The government, on the other hand, implicitly reneged on its end of the deal at
a time when Pat most needed assistance, as recessionary periods tend to disproportionately
negatively impact female-headed households. 270 Clearly, the EITC is not a safety net program
with regard to Pat.
3. The Ugly: Gina
Recall Gina from Table 10 who lost her job in 2012 and remained unemployed for all of
2013. As a result, Gina was not entitled to an EITC in 2013. Sadly, Gina’s experience is fairly
typical of low-income single mothers during the early 2000s. While all families suffered, the
economic downturn hit families headed by single mothers especially hard. 271 For the one in four
U.S. households that is female-headed, the Great Recession exacerbated a period of losing
ground that began in 2000. 272 Single mother employment rates peaked in 1999, and have been
on the decline ever since. 273 Between 1999 and 2007, all single mothers experienced a 5 percent
decline in employment. The subpopulation of EITC-eligible single mothers bore the brunt of
this decline, as their employment rate declined by 12 percent over this same period. 274 In 2009,
over a quarter of single mothers were jobless the entire year, a third were jobless in an average
month, and less than half were employed full-time year-round. 275

270

KELLY D. EDMISTON, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, THE LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME
POPULATION IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY: RESULTS FROM A NEW SURVEY 1, available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/13q1Edmiston.pdf. See also BITLER & HOYNES, supra note 107,
at 2 (providing “we also know that downturns cause larger negative impacts on those with lower education and skill
levels”). Chi-Fang Wu & Mary Keegan Eamon, Patterns and Correlates of Involuntary Unemployment and
Underemployment in Single-Mother Families, 33(6) CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 820, 821 (2011) (providing
“families headed by single mothers are at heightened risk of experiencing economic hardships and the effects of
economic recessions more severely”).
271
Id.
272
Id. at 820.
273
Meyer, supra note 47, at 164 tbl. 6.
274
Id. (referring to single mothers with low education levels).
275
LEGAL MOMENTUM, THE WOMEN’S LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, SINGLE MOTHERS SINCE 2000:
FALLING FARTHER DOWN 1-2, http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-work/women-and-poverty/resources-publications/single-mothers-since-2000.pdf.
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Increased joblessness and decreased access to EITC (and welfare) combined to increase
single mother poverty. In 2009, 38 percent of single mothers were poor; whereas, only 8 percent
of married women were poor. 276 Between 2000 and 2009, the percentage of single mothers with
an income less than the poverty level rose by 6 percentage points from 32 percent to 38
percent. 277 By way of comparison, married women poverty increased by only 2 percentage
points from 6 percent to 8 percent. 278
This has led to an increase in the number of “disconnected women.” 279 This group includes
single mother former welfare recipients who are no longer working nor receiving any form of
cash-based public assistance. 280

Losing a job is the most common reason for becoming

disconnected, even more common than loss of welfare. 281 With a job loss, these women fall off
the EITC benefit schedule and as a result of welfare reform, fail to connect with the TANF
schedule. As a result, disconnected families are worse off economically than other low-income
single-mother families. 282 The likelihood of becoming disconnected is related to the overall state
of the labor market. 283 The percent of low-income single mothers who are disconnected has
increased since the mid-1990s. About 1 in 8 low-income single mothers were disconnected in

276

GABE, supra note 112, at CRS-72 tbl. C-4 (2011).
Id.
278
Id.
279
See PAMELA LOPREST & AUSTIN NICHOLS, THE URBAN INST., DYNAMICS OF BEING DISCONNECTED FROM
WORK AND TANF, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412393-Dynamics-of-Being-Disconnectedfrom-Work-and-TANF.pdf; Lesley J. Turner et al., Failing the Transition from Welfare to Work: Women
Chronically Disconnected from Employment and Cash Welfare, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 227 (2006); Rebecca M. Blank &
Brian Kovak, The Growing Problem of Disconnected Single Mothers, in MAKING THE WORK-BASED SAFETY NET
WORK BETTER 227 (Carolyn Heinrich and John Karl Scholz eds., 2009).
280
Id.
281
LOPREST & NICHOLS, supra note 279, at ix. Accord Turner et al., supra note 279, at 245 (indicating that job
loss played a more common role in causing a spell of disconnectedness than welfare loss); Blank & Kovak, supra
note 279, at 243 (stating that “[m]ore than half (57.5) of [disconnected] spells start because of a change in earnings,
probably caused by the loss of a job”). Finding a job is the most common reason for becoming reconnected. Id.
282
Id.
283
Moore et al., The Dynamics of Women Disconnected from Employment and Welfare, 86 SOC. SERV. REV. 93,
110-11 (2012) (indicating that the “monthly state unemployment rate is estimated to have a large, statistically
significant, and positive association with becoming disconnected.”).
277
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1996; whereas, 1 in 5 were disconnected in the period from 2004 to 2008. 284 This data does not
include the period encompassing the Great Depression and its aftermath, but early data indicates
a continued increase in the number of disconnected women. 285
Part III. Proposal
One may wonder why Gina remained unemployed throughout 2013. Given the extremely
bad labor market, it may be the case that Gina searched all year but simply could not find a job.
In that case, Gina was involuntarily unemployed. Gina raises a question about whether workpremised programs, like the EITC and post-reform welfare, are the proper safety net tools to rely
on in recessionary periods. Recall Greenspan’s quote from the Introduction, during recessionary
periods, most work reductions are driven not by incentives, but by the compromised state of the
economy. In a weak labor market, a focus on work incentives is misplaced. Instead, during
recessionary periods cash-based safety net programs aimed at low-income female-headed
households should focus on stabilizing incomes to prevent falls into poverty.
This Part III. offers a narrowly tailored proposal (Proposal) designed to ameliorate the effects
of EITC income destabilization during recessionary periods. Under the Proposal, when the
economy meets some pre-defined conditions indicating a recession, the EITC phasein range (for
every type of EITC claimant) would shift up and result in an EITC budget function that
resembled a NIT with an income disregard. Recall that under a traditional NIT program, the
maximum transfer amount is provided to non-workers and is immediately reduced as earnings
increase at a pre-defined benefit reduction rate. Under an NIT with an income disregard, the
maximum benefit is not reduced until after an initial amount of income is earned. 286 The

284

Id. Accord Turner et al., supra note 279, at 229 (providing that the number of disconnected women
fluctuated between 11 and 15 percent from 1975 to 1995, but that following the 2001 recession that number
increased to 20 percent in 2002 and 2003).
285
Id.
286
Browning, supra note 49, at 24-5.
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purpose of introducing an income disregard is to minimize the work disincentives generated by a
traditional NIT program. In contrast, the purpose of the income disregard under the Proposal is
to prevent EITC income destabilization.
The modifications under the Proposal would only apply to those individuals who claimed an
EITC in the previous tax year. There are two reasons for this limitation. First, newly-eligible
EITC recipients only realize income stabilization from the EITC. Stated another way, they do
not need protection against EITC income destabilization. Second, as described in more detail
below, it limits the category of non-working individuals who can claim a credit under the
Proposal.
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The following Figure 5 diagrams the Proposal as applied in 2013 to a single parent with two
children along with the unmodified EITC budget function for the same type of taxpayer.

The goal of the Proposal is to maximize EITC income stabilization (or eliminate phasein
range destabilization) during recessionary periods. Essentially, under the Proposal, the phasein
range is eliminated but all other EITC parameters (maximum credit amount and the
threshold/completed phaseout amounts) remain unchanged. As a result, no taxpayer can suffer
phasein range marginal income destabilization.287 Post-tax income can only be stabilized or
unaffected under the Proposal. Low-income single mother families who normally reside in the
phasein range will realize significant income stabilization benefits in the year of conversion and
suffer no EITC-induced income destabilization while the Proposal remains in effect. It will also
287

Of course, if a taxpayer moves from a more generous to a less generous EITC schedule because of a change
in family status (getting married, divorced, or gaining/losing a qualifying child) destabilization may result. The
Proposal does not address that type of EITC income destabilization.
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prevent the irrational income destabilization of certain taxpayers experiencing phaseout-tophasein pre-tax earnings losses. 288
To see this numerically, recall Pat who suffered a purely within-phasein-range annual wage
decline between 2012 and 2013.

Assume that in 2013 the economy met the pre-enacted

triggering conditions and the 2013 EITC schedule converted to the Proposal. Table 11 illustrates
how the Proposal changed Pat’s post-tax income situation for the better.

Table 11: Pat

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$12,000
$10,000
$2,000

Stabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
Proposal

Income
Tax
$0
$0
$0
36.25%
N/A
7.65%
28.60%

Payroll
Tax
$918
$765
$153

Proposal
$4,800
$5,372
$572

Post-Tax
Income
$15,882
$14,607
$1,275

($725/$2,000)
N/A
($153/$2,000)
($572/$2,000)

Under the proposal, when Pat’s annual wages declined by $2,000 her EITC amount increased by
$572. As a result, the Proposal stabilized Pat’s post-tax income by about 29 percent. Compare
this to Pat’s outcome under the normal EITC in Table 6: the EITC destabilized Pat’s income by
19 percent because her credit amount decreased by $800 in response to her earnings loss.
Overall, including the Proposal, the tax system offset about 36 percent of Pat’s $2,000 pre-tax
wage decline.
Clearly, the Proposal rebalances the competing EITC objectives by elevating income
stabilization over work incentives as a policy priority during recessionary periods.

288

The

See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying text.
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Proposal’s zero percent marginal rate creates additional work disincentives as compared to the
normal EITC phasein structure. However, it does so only temporarily and at a time when the
need for income stabilization is most acute and work incentives are unlikely to operate
effectively. 289
Most controversially, an unemployed individual can claim the maximum credit amount under
the Proposal, provided, of course, that he or she claimed the EITC in the previous year. 290 This
seemingly violates one of the central unwavering tenants of the EITC program: it only applies to
Workers. However, it need not violate, as much as redefine, what it means to be a “Worker” in
recessionary periods. Under the Proposal, you are considered a “Worker” and eligible for a
credit, if you are working or were working before the recession hit. The Proposal recognizes that
this type of “Worker” is probably involuntarily unemployed. Since the EITC was designed to
target motivation, and not opportunity, there is no EITC-based policy reason to punish this type
of individual. To the contrary, the Proposal offers the cyclically-induced unemployed individual
the maximum EITC credit amount in order to stabilize income.

289

See note 20 and accompanying text.
An individual who became unemployed in the year of conversion would remain eligible for a credit for as
long as the Proposal remained in effect.
290

67

Please Do Not Cite or Reproduce Without Permission

For example, recall Gina who worked in 2012, but was unemployed for all of 2013. Table 12
describes how Gina’s income situation was improved by the Proposal.

Table 12: Gina

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$15,000
$0
$15,000

Stabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
Proposal

Income Tax Payroll Tax Proposal
$0
$1,148
$5,236
$0
$0
$5,372
$0
$1,148
$136

PostTax
Income
$19,089
$5,372
$13,717

8.56% ($1,284/$15,000)
N/A
7.65% ($1,148/$15,000)
0.91% ($136/$15,000)

Recall from Table 10 that Gina’s unmodified EITC amount declined by $5,236 when she lost her
job thereby destabilizing Gina’s post-tax income by 35 percent. Under the Proposal, the EITC
amount remained almost the same between 2012 and 2013. 291 As a result, Gina suffered no
EITC income destabilization and the tax system overall offset her earnings loss by about 9
percent. 292
The Proposal draws from a concept in the macroeconomic literature known as formula
flexibility. 293

Richard Musgrave defined formula flexibility as “an arrangement whereby

changes in tax rates and/or expenditure levels are legislated in advance, to go into effect if and
when specified changes in income occur.” 294

For example, pre-enacted legislation could

291

The slight increase in the ETIC amount is entirely attributable to the required annual inflation adjustment.
See supra note 189.
292
Attributable in large part to the 7.65 percent payroll tax reduction.
293
See generally LAURENCE SEIDMAN, AUTOMATIC FISCAL POLICIES TO COMBAT RECESSIONS (2003).
294
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 512 (1959).
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provide that income tax rates be lowered by x percent when unemployment exceeds y percent. 295
Prior legislation would also define the economic conditions under which all pre-enacted changes
would cease and the tax system would revert to its original form.
Formula flexibility was seen by its advocates as an alternative to relying on “discretionary
fiscal policy” (a one-time tax rebate, temporary reduction in tax rates, etc.) to combat recessions.
Discretionary policy relies on Congress to take affirmative action. This type of fiscal policy is
not always effective because it requires 1) Congress to act and 2) in a timely manner. Advocates
viewed formula flexibility as the solution to these two problems.

Business-cycle-induced

changes in tax rates or transfer payments are triggered automatically under a formula without
required Congressional action. 296
Formula flexibility should be distinguished from built-in flexibility or automatic stabilization
introduced in Part II above. Federal tax system automatic stabilization is an accidental byproduct of a system designed to achieve other societal goals (equity, efficiency, revenue raising,
etc.); whereas, formula flexibility is specifically designed to achieve maximum income
stabilization during economic downturns. 297 Furthermore, “[automatic stabilization] is built into
the existing tax and transfer payment structure, while the [formula flexibility], when activated,
changes the structure itself.” 298

295

ALAN S. BLINDER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 65 (1974). Triggers can also be pre-enacted to cool
off the economy. Id. For example, income tax rates will increase by p percent when inflation hits q percent. Id.
296
The idea of using fiscal policy (as opposed to monetary policy) to stabilize the economy during a recession
fell out of favor with most economists in the late 1970s. SEIDMAN, supra note 293, at xi, xii. See also Listokin,
supra note 13, at 47 (lamenting that during the 1980s until the Great Recession, tax policy scholars conceded to the
claimed primacy of monetary policy over fiscal policy and tax-based automatic stabilization fell out of favor). The
2001 recession witnessed a rebirth for countercyclical fiscal policy as Congress moved relatively fast to enact a tax
rebate to stimulate the economy). SEIDMAN. See also Listokin at 47-8 (pinpointing the tax cuts enacted in response
to the Great Recession as the moment for the reemergence of fiscal stabilization as a policy tool).
297
SEIDMAN, supra note 293, at xvi.-iii.
298
Howard Pack, Formula Flexibility: A Quantitative Appraisal, in STUDIES IN ECONOMIC STABILIZATION 5-7
(Albert Ando et al. eds., 1968).
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The current design of the EITC as a targeted wage subsidy is intended to provide an income
transfer while encouraging work or more work effort. The credit’s (de)stabilization properties
are an unintended by-product of that design. In contrast, the Proposal would change the current
structure specifically to boost the credit’s income stabilization capabilities (or prevent income
destabilization) during recessionary periods.

The normal EITC structure and purpose are

restored once normal economic conditions prevail.
The most obvious problem with this strategy is devising suitable formula ex ante to produce
the desired result at the desired time. Of course, this drawback is minimized by the fact that the
pre-enacted legislation is simply a default position. Congress can always change the formula
(but if Congress tweaks the formula after the fact it coverts from formula-driven to discretionary
fiscal policy, with all of its own drawbacks). However, if Congress fails to take any action, the
pre-legislated tax change is promptly triggered by a decline in the economy. 299 In a sense,
formula flexibility is the opposite of temporary tax legislation. Under the former, a tax change
comes into existence unless Congress acts; whereas, under the latter, a tax change ceases to exist
unless Congress acts. 300 Although this article does not define the pre-conditions that would
trigger the proposed change, given the argued for link between the EITC and the health of the
labor market, a formula linked to the unemployment level seems a natural fit.
A second less obvious problem is budgetary impact. Congress does not know when or if the
change will occur, how long it will stay in effect, or how many taxpayers it will effect. As a

299

SEIDMAN, supra note 293, at xv.
See generally, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in
the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006) (critically analyzing sunset provisions and arguing that despite proponent’s
claims, these provisions may increase the perversion of the tax legislative process); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting
Legislation, 159 PA. L. REV. 1007 (2011) (arguing for the primacy of permanent over temporary tax legislation);
Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 249 (2007) (analyzing the historical, legal and
political implications of temporary tax legislation and concluding that such legislation should be “embraced as the
rule rather than eschewed even as an exception” in the proper policy domains).
300
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result, there is no way to forecast its cost. 301

Contingent program expenditures could be

minimized by pre-enacting dollar or time limits. For example, the Proposal’s modifications
would cease if its cost exceeded 15 percent of mean annual expenditure under the regular EITC
over last three years. Alternatively, Congress could restrict the operation of the Proposal to a
maximum of two or three taxable years.
Of course, under the Proposal, all good things must come to an end. Upon an economic
recovery, the EITC structure reverts to its original form. This reversion is the most serious
drawback of the proposal. Phasein range income destabilization will result for many phasein
claimants when the original lower EITC amounts are restored. Even worse, a within-phaseinrange earnings loss occurring in the year of restoration could generate greater post-tax income
destabilization than if the changes never occurred.

301

Existing budget rules may need to be changed to accommodate such a program. See generally, COMM. ON
WAYS & MEANS, 110TH CONG., COMPILATION OF LAWS AND RULES RELATING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROCESS (Comm. Print 2008).
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To see why, consider Pat’s post-tax income situation in 2014 if the economy improved so
that the EITC reverted to its original form. The following Table 13 specifies Pat’s results if she
experienced a $5,000 annual earnings loss in 2014. 302

Table 13: Pat

2012
2013
Δ

Earnings
$10,000
$5,000
$5,000

Destabilization Ratio
Income Tax
Payroll Tax
EITC

Income Tax
$0
$0
$0
-59.79%
N/A
7.65%
-67.44%

Payroll Tax
$765
$383
$383

EITC
$5,372
$2,000
$3,372

Post-Tax
Income
$14,607
$6,618
$7,990

(-$2,990/$5,000)
N/A
($153/$5,000)
($-3,372/$5,000)

The reverted EITC exacerbated Pat’s pre-tax earnings loss by 67 percent.

Recall that an

unmodified EITC phasein range can only destabilize post-tax income by a maximum of 40
percent. Accordingly, the effect of the Proposal is to delay and ultimately increase the amount of
EITC income destabilization for many low-income working families.
Reversion-year destabilization, however, does not sabotage the utility of the proposal. The
EITC critique in the article is not that EITC income destabilization is, in and of itself, a bad
thing. Under normal economic conditions, the EITC properly trades off the benefit of providing
a wage subsidy to low-income working families with the potential cost of destabilizing the
incomes of those same families if annual earnings losses occur. Instead, this article’s claim is a
more nuanced one. In severe economic downturns, the subsidy is likely to be ineffective and the
likelihood of widespread income destabilization substantially increases.

Hence, the policy

302

Calculated using 2013 EITC parameters, assuming no inflation between 2013 and 2014. See supra note 42
and accompanying Table 1.
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balance shifts in favor of stabilization over work incentives.

However, once economic

conditions return to normal, the primacy of providing positive work incentives is restored and the
concern about EITC income destabilization is diminished.
Furthermore, even if the concern about EITC restoration year income destabilization is valid,
it could easily be mitigated. Under the current Proposal, the EITC phasein rate moves from a
negative 40 percent to a zero percent rate. The greater the difference between these two rates,
the higher the potential for income destabilization when the normal EITC is restored. The
Proposal could easily be tweaked to change the phasein marginal rate to a negative 20 percent
(20 Percent Proposal).

The resulting structure of the EITC with the 20 Percent Proposal

(assuming the economic conditions triggered a conversion) is illustrated in Figure 6.

Under the 20 Percent Proposal, income stabilization provided during the recessionary period
would be lower but the potential amount of income destabilization during the restoration year
would be cut in half, as compared to the original Proposal. Notice that if economic conditions
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are such that the Proposal remains in effect for multiple years, the possibility of phasein
destabilization is re-introduced, albeit at a lower rate than under the normal EITC.

As a

corollary, the 20 percent Proposal would maintain positive work incentives, but at a lower rate
than the normal EITC.
Conclusion
This article introduced income (de)stabilization as a new variable to be accounted for in
evaluations of the EITC program, in addition to efficiency (labor incentives) and equity
(redistributive or antipoverty effectiveness). 303 The challenge, of course, is that these competing
objectives are sometimes at odds with each other. Recall that the EITC phaseout range provides
marginal stabilization benefits, the plateau region provides no stabilization benefits, and the
phasein range marginally destabilizes post-tax income relative to pre-tax income. This result is
an unavoidable consequence of the design of the EITC as a work subsidy that phases out at
higher income levels. The EITC phaseout reduces the payoff from working more within a year,
but it also cushions the effect of annual wage declines. 304 In contrast, the wage subsidy provided
in the phasein region increases the payoff from working more within a given year, but it also
exacerbates annual earnings losses. Clearly, there is a tension between the EITC’s efficiency and
income stabilization capabilities.
However, this tension remained hidden during the economic boom of the 1990s. The EITC
was originally enacted to incentive poor single mothers to make the transition from welfare to
work. Of course, an implicit requirement for this strategy to succeed was a job market with
excess capacity to absorb these newly motivated workers. During the 1990s, such a labor market
303

See Kniesner & Ziliak, Implicit Insurance, supra note 13, at 18 (lamenting that optimal tax analyses misses
stabilization and associated consumption-smoothing as an additional welfare-enhancing aspect of an income tax to
be traded-off with equity and efficiency).
304
HERWIG IMMERVOLL & MARK PEARSON, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LABOR, A Good Time for Making Work
Pay? Taking Stock of In-Work Benefits and Related Measures Across the OECD 44 (2009),
http://ftp.iza.org/pp3.pdf.
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existed and single mothers moved into jobs. The combination of earnings and EITC lifted many
female-headed households out of poverty. In other words, with a strong labor market, the EITC
employment incentives and resulting antipoverty effectiveness properly took center stage and
income destabilization remained in the background as an unrealized lurking threat.
However, low-income single-mother families fully realized the negative consequences of
EITC-phasein-income destabilization during the 2001 and 2008 recessions. The extremely weak
labor market disproportionately impacted low-income female-headed households as earnings
declined and jobs disappeared.

The associated loss of EITC benefits worsened the economic

well-being of single parent families, reversing many of the gains made during the 1990s. During
these recessionary periods, work incentives were nullified and the income stabilization potential
of the EITC moved to the forefront.
As a result, a new definition of EITC antipoverty effectiveness emerged.

Rather than

measuring how many families were lifted out of poverty through its wage subsidy, during
recessionary periods the EITC would be judged by how many families it prevented from falling
into poverty through its income stabilization benefit. However, as this paper demonstrated,
households receiving the benefit of the wage subsidy during the 1990s were not the same
families realizing the income stabilization benefit of the EITC during the 2000s. Stated another
way, EITC phasein income destabilization prevented the program from assisting the exact
demographic group it was designed to help (poor single mother families) at the exact wrong time
(recessionary periods). As a result, the EITC failed as a safety net for this fragile sub-population
of beneficiaries. Reformed welfare offered little to no relief.
This article offered a narrowly-tailored Proposal that altered the structure of the phasein
range during recessionary periods in order to mitigate the problem of EITC-induced income
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destabilization. By recognizing that labor incentives are rendered ineffective during economic
downturns, the Proposal properly rebalanced the competing EITC objectives and elevated
income stabilization over work subsidies as the means to prevent single mother poverty.
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